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CHAPmR I
THE 'lHBOLOGY AND IANGUAGB OP RU~LF BUL'IMANN
Chapter I shall serve as a_ summary for this paper.

I take ·the

liberty of speaking in the f irst··p erson in_ order to specify what my
concern has been, and to summarize the conclusions I have reached.
In this study I have attempted to determine ,fhat influence Rudolf
Bultmann's theology bas had upon his usage of language.

'Ibis attempt

has led, simultaneously, to the characterization of his view of
language. P.inally, I have attempted a critical evaluation of his
theology, and with it a concurrent evaluation of the view of language which finds its genesis within that theology.
My purpose has been twofold.

~

have set as an objective a more

intimate knowledge of Bultmann's theology.

In addition, I have had

as a purpose to demonstrate that a theologian's view of language and
its usage are ~etermined largely by the theology developed.

Par

Bultmann'.s attempt to theologize not only exe1'>1if ies· his view of
language in action; it also fashions and constructs the view of language which is mirrored in such an expression.
It·was a difficult matter to determine what the exact boundaries
of the study should_ ·be. Almost immediately I discovered that a st~dy.
of Bultmann's theology was necessary if I wished to investigate his
view of language.

But such a study of theology was to be a means to

an end, and not the end itself.

On the other hand, the theology of

Bultmann is so cohesive that the task, once begun, had to be carried
through to completion.
.

'lbroughout the study, the explication
of
.

his .

2

theology· was carried on solely to determine what view of language was
his.

In a similar vein, the critique and analysis of that theology

was to serve the purpose of demonstrati~g the positive and negative
aspects of his view of language.
Within the boundaries described, I attempted to reach a description of Bultmann's "view of language."

When this term is used, it

refers to the philosophy overarching the use of symbolic forms.

I

began with- the presupposition that language in some way utilizes man's
.A bility to symbolize.

Por man is able to symbolize his own

thought-processes, objects outside of himself, and the relation
between these t\«>.

A view of language, then, is the overarching

princ-iple or rul~ one adopts in his process of symbolizing.

It follows

necessarily th,1t one's interpretation of man (and hence of his

thought-process), the object~ outside of him, and the relation betweensuch a group of interpretations will vitally affect ·on6' s view of language.

Bultmann's theology, his interpretation of these factors and

their inter-relation, was held to be the key to his vie\"/ of language.
I began the study with a consideration of ..Bultmann's theology

as it affected his view of language.

Looking first at his major

presuppositions, I advanced to a consideration of existential analysis
and the existentiell moment, the process of demythoiogizing as a consequent of his methodological approach, the kervea as judgment and
grace, and faith as immune from ei_ther proof or disproof.

I then

turned to the view of theological language which had emerged.

After

considering the theological presuppositions of his language and discussi.ng a tentative definition

or· "language"

for him, I examined

3

one of his sermons to determine if his view of language was e~
fied there.

li-

In the last chapter of the paper, I evaluated his theology

(and the resultant view of language) from within his own system, and
then from vantage points outside of the system.
In t.,_is study I have found that a view of .language does indeed
emerge from the theology of Rudolf Bultmann.

··

Por it becomes apparent

that Bultmann's transfexelice::.: of Heidegger's categories of existentialia into his own system is an_ eventful step in the process of
constructing a frame for language.

r:. .....

lbese existentialia serve as

categories of existential being mirrored in the archetypes of language.
In addition, just as there are existentiel.1 moments which either
authenticate or inauthenticate the existential possibilities
Cexistentialia), so it appears that there are referents for the
linguistic archetypes which give .these · archetypes the ring of. either
authenticity or unauthenticity.

As a result, language for Bultmann

is the process of attributing authentic referents to archetypes,
simultaneously displacing the unauthentic refere~ts and the unauthen•

tic archetypes which have been created by such referents.

It is

this view of language which suffers under criticism of his theology.•
•

Por ther, are aspects of his fra~e of thought which demonstrate
inconsistency even within the system.

In addition, when his system

is evaluated from without, some glarjng inadequacies quickly appear.
· Por Bultmann has committed to phenomenological existential analysis
the question of ultimate Being.
tive language:as meaningless.
,I

He

has dismissed the usage of obj~c-

'Ibe applicatlon of criticism to these
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inadequacies shakes the very bedrock of his view of language. His
theology suffers a double blow:

it must recognize its own shortcomings;

and it must concede that its supr,or·t for a view of lan~uage has "been
weakened.
The major sources utilized in this study were primarily from
Bultmann's own hand.

The two translated volumes of Xerypa and Myth;

his Bssays 1 Philosophical and Theological; the recently translated
volume of monographs entitled Bxistence and Paith; the sermonic
compendium., 'Ibis ~\forld and Beyond; and his apologetic work, Jesus
Christ and Mytholosx... these works were the major sources.

Utilized

in the evaluatative and interpretative task were John Macguarrie's
'Dle Scope ·of Demythologizing•
and Leopold Malevez•· 'lbe Christian
.
.

Message and Myth.

In

an attempt at objectivity, I allowed the

the authors to speak in their ·ow.a words whenever possible.
\fl1ile there is a good deal of writing which concerns itse;f with
Bultmann's theology, both commendatory and critical, I have found no
examination of the view of language which Bultmann holds.

It seems

that no lines of acmmunication between the modern philosophy of
analysis and t~e realm of existen~ial theology have been constructed.
Por there is little concern for Bultmann's view of language among
his critics, even though the world of philosophy is alive with
li~guistic analysis.
This research pr~ject has allowed me to advance to some depth
in the theology of a modern thinker, although admit·t edly the depths
have not been plum.bed.

In addition, X have been permitted :.to• see

s
both the importance and the validity of the question of meaning
which the advanced-logical positivists are askJng al$o of the theologians of our modern era.

For in final analysis, the study of

language is the study of meaning; from such a study theologians
and· their works ar·e not exempt.

..

CHAPTBR II
1HB THBOLOGY OP RUDOLF BUtmAmr .

1'heological Pac·tors in His View of Language
Oile can assume that the theology of Audolf Bultmann will have a
.

.

very definite influence upon _any t~eory of language which he might
espouse, either consciously or_unconsciously.

Por if Bultmann's

theology deals with ultimate truth, then certainly the spoken- truth,
as well as the method utilized in forming that spoken truth, will be a
reflection of t~t ultimate truth.

If there is a metaphysic to be

found in the theology of Rudolf Bultmann, then it can be assumed that
the method employed to speak of such a metaphysic ·wi.11 surely be
selected with care.

"

Bultmann·'s use of analogy in the construction of

theology is not an unconscious selectiQn.

His theology definitely

influences t~e way in which_he·speaks. -It ·i s ~ecessary, therefore~ if
.

.

we wish to determine what Bultmann's view of language is, for us to

review the basic tenets of his theology.

With that purpose in mind,

we now turn to a ·c onsideration-of ·his theology, desiring thereby to

isolate those aspects of the same which play a significant role in
his view of language, either consciously or unconsciously.
~ny review of the theology of Rudolf B~tlmann must begin of
.

.

.

necessity with the basic assumptions which he-selects.

The success

which we have in isolating such assumptions will determine, to a large
degree, the success we shall have in reviewing bis theology as a whole.

7

lbe first and most influential presupposition which is Bultmann's
is that all theology is to be expressed ·in term:•-· -of man's existence.
Putting this assumption conversely, one could say that for Bultmann
all theology is nothing more, nor less, than an attempt to clarify
man'·s self-understanding.
only insofar as

He

It is .possible, therefore-, to speak of God

impinges upon man's self-understanding. As a conse-

quence, it is totally irrele.vant to speak of God as He is "in H

elf":

'lbe incomprehensibility of ·God lies not in the spher~ of theoretical thought but in the sphere of personal existence. Not
,mat God is in Himself, but how he acts with men, is the mystery
in which faith is interested. 1bis is a- mystery not to theoretical thought, but to the natural wills and desires of men. 1 .
Bultmann reminds us of the logical positivist·s in his .method of stipulating what areas of thoughtare meaningful when one wishes to discuss God.

"Only such statement_s about God are legitimate as express

the existential relation between God and man. 112 His emphasis upon
the existential relation between God and man is reminiscent of his
contemporary, Martin Buber.3
Since bis discussion about God must be £or.related with God's
relation to man, Bultmann is not interested in investigating, within
theological research, "existence within faith~·•~ but rather the
.

1

.

"nat~al man. 4 His approach to· the Bible is also made in terms of
11

this natural man, ·even when this approach is made within the Church
itself:

"I think ·I may take for granted that the righ-t question to

frame with regard to the Bible~at any rate within the Church--is the
question of human existence. 11S
Bultmann's major assumption, that theology is possible only in ·
-terms of man's existence, is a commitment to carry on all theological

8

endeavor for the .advancement of man's self-understanding.

Po·r behind

the assumption that all theology must be relative to man's existence
is tbe ·assumption that self-understanding is the most important aspect.

of man's existence.

He

argues, then, that all theologizing must be

carried on ,a.th the goal of nurturing self-und~rstanding ~thin existence.· In discussing what benefits Christianity as an oriental religion brought to the west, he isolates the "ne,f possibilities for the
understanding of human existence~6 as the most important and influential gift transliterated by Christianity.

In attempting-to filter·

out Bultmann's presuppositions, Barth suggests that "prior understanding," the fact that all understanding is concerned in one way. or
.

another with man's understanding

of

himself, is the primary ground

rule of Bultmann's thought. 7 Bultmann's concern with theology as:it

relates to man's existential situa_tion, -h is self-understanding, is no
aftertho-ught.

Rather, it is a primary assumption which will have

ramifications throughout his theology.

"Die Begriff der SelbstveJ:-

stlndnis bei Bultmann hat nun ,eittragende theologische IConsequenzen,
denen man nicbt ohne weiteres zustimm.en muss und kann."8
Bultmann's primary assumption will not only have effects upon

his whole theology; it will also grossly affect any attempt at delineating his view 0£ language.

If .it is true that all theological lan-

guage can be uttered only from within the existence of man, the logical question to be asked is, \'lhat- are the determinative rules o_f such
a language?

'Ibis procedure ~f subsuming al_l!·theolo·gy .and· ·a.11 ·.thea~: · ~-

logical language _to an aspect of self-understanding will affect lan-

guage in many ways. · 'lbere will ·be no room for "objective•• language
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of any sort or kind.

All valid and meaningful language will by its

nature have referents within the sphere of human existence and
self-understanding. _P inally, since self-understanding is a condition
of the "moment,·•~ a situation only of the present, all language can
deal only with the present situation if it is to be valid and mean~
ingful.

All of these overarching rules of language flow from this

one major assumption; these particular aspects of Bultmann's linguistic view will become more clear as we proceed.
'lbe second major methodological assumption of Bultmann flows
from the first.
sake of clarity.

We consider it as a separate presupposition for the
This assumption is that no theological formulations

are to be constructed in a subject-object form.

While.the fi~st assump-

tion dealt with theology as a whole, the second deals specifically
with theological formulations.

Bultmann is in revolt against those

who desire to place God in the sphere of natural reality, and ma~e Him

only.quantitatively differ~nt.
of God as Another a1110ng many.

He is offended by those who would speak
Par him, God is qualitatively differ-

ent, and any formulation "about" Him must take a qualitatively differ. ent form. _Again we notice a close affinity with. Buber in this regard;
for Buber distinguishes between the .world of I-IT and I-1HOU, al'Jd
they are qualitatively different. 9 Bultmann, like Buber, is. ready
to admit the validity and propriety ·o f subject-object formulations·
in the field of science, where man looks at his environment.

But he

denies the validity of such a procedure when man looks at himself. 10
Bven when man looks about himself within the ob.jects of creation, and
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makes the some,fhat scientific statement.that the nature and history
,ti.thin which his life takes place are ruled by God's action, even
sueh a statement as ~his can only be . made as a confession; it can -

never be expressed as a general truth.11
This second major assumption flows from the first.

But it is

not any less important when an attempt is made to formulate Bultmann's
view of language.

Por his rejection of subject-object formulations

will have repercussions throughout his view of language.

logical language will never again be able to deal with

T.tue theo-

God

as an

"object" in the sense that the natural sciences differentiate between
objects quantitatively.

'lbeo·logical language will have to be qualita-

tively different because it deals with God,

,mo

is never an objec~,

~ut qualitatively different from all else.
Having considered Bultmann's presuppositions as they apply to
his language, we shall now turn to his theology proper.

One might be

tempted to suggest that we turn to Bultmann's existential analysis
rather than to his theology, for they seem to be so closely intertwined
-

so as to be almost inseparable.

lbe first major aspect of his theo-

~ogy which we shall consider with a ·view to\,rards deciphering his
language-form is his reliance upon this existential analysis and its
relation to th~ exis.tentieli moment.

While ii; is easily said that

Bultmann is a "Christian existentialist," it is not quite as easily
determined

ho\f

he can be called by that name.

It \\10Uld take much

effort to attempt a definition of existentialism, or "Christian existentialism~; !' The "Christian existentialist" would simultaneously complain

11

that any such attempt at definition \10uld be a "dis-heartening" of
his system.

Nevertheless, it remains for us to attempt to describe

the impact that existential analysis has made upon Bultmann's theology, and his view of language.

We shall begin by demonstrating his

reliance upon Heidegger's philosophy.
tion of existential analysis.

We shall then turn to a descrip-

We shall conclude by demonstrating the

importance of the existentiell moment in his theology and language-view.

It is, without doubt, advantageous to investigate Dultmann's

reliance upon Heidegger in any attempt to account for the influence

of ey.J.stential analysis within his theology.

Bultmann claims that all

he owes to the philosophy of Heidegger is that he has learned from it
to look at the phenomena themselves.

His theology ~as learned fro111

this philosophy to let itself be taught solely by the phenomena, by
man, whose structure philosophy seeks to clisclose.1 2 Brown reminds us
that Heidegger owes much to his teacher, Husseri.13

Insofar as pheno-

menology attempts to determine the object~ ,mich it grasps, it ~s
dependent upon Kantian idealism, Bultmann•s objection not\ri.thstanding.
In delineating more specifically Bultmann's reliance upon Heidegger,
Malevez suggests that Bultmann expects t,,o indispensable services from
Heidegger: (1) Heidegger's philosophy, in its understanding of the
desperate condition of Dasein (distress), provides an existential
analysis which will give understanding to the aversio a deo; (2) the
ontology of Heidegger. is able to provide us ,dth the categories appropriate for the correct expression of a divine saving-event, wrought
in Christ, while our fren ncceptance of such an event tdll assure our
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authenticity.14 In regard to the second service rendered by Heidegger,
it is interesting to take notice of the apparent similarity between
Heidegger's "call" and Bultmann's lterygma:

Heidegger describes man

as "listening" in the moment of decision, for being (Dasein) hears
itself ca11.1s
Bultmann's reliance upon Heidegger will have at least t\'JD i11DDed·iate effects upon any view of language he might uphold.

First, the

fact that philosophy.will provide theological language with the
.existential frames necessary to understand the aversio _a deo presupposes that this part of language may be misused and: .miShandled~--\>Y
·t hose who do not have the true knowledge of the aversio even t~ugh
they have the framing equipment.

This point will be further exempli-

fied at a.later section of the paper.

'lbe second effect of

Heidegger's philosophy upon Bultmann's view of language will be more
direct.

Por Heidegger has bis o,m vi.ew of language. and we can look

for its influence within Bultmann • . Heidegger is quick to reje~t any
consideration of a "thinking subject" as the starting..point of
philosophy:
· If one thing la.~clear in Heidegger, it is that he decisively
rejects the thinking subject as the starting-point of philosophy•
.Bxistence is always the concrete •situation of the self·• s
involvement with. the world and with other selves. 16
Heidegger must conclude that lan~age too cannot arise from a ''thinking
subject," but ·must find· its origin within the self's involvement with
the world and other selves. As such, it can be postulated '.· that for.
Bultmann language must originate not within the "thin~ng self," but
within the environment of man's existence.

Such a view of language
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· will have its problems, as: we shall note later.
Now we take up the task of :·d escribing existential· analysis· as·.it

plays a role in Bul tmann·'·s· theology.

'lbe reference just •de to the

origin of language wl.thin existence is a good beginning for an understanding of existential analysis.

Bultmann asserts that the origin

of concepts (and hence, of language) lies in actual life:
If I do not· know friendship itself, then I _also can never
understand the concept of friendship. Por the origin of concepts
is not isolated thinking in and by itself, but rather the
actual life to which thinking belongs.17
If life, "actual life to which thinking belongs," is the source of
concepts, then surely it is l«>rthy of further examination.

Bultmann

has reminded us above that he learned from Heidegger to look at the
phenomena of life in and of themselves.

Existential analysis is the

process of investigating man as7 .he ~:lives· id.thin existence.

Bultmann

recognizes that the philosophy of existentialism has attempted just
such an examination.

He is willing to listen to Heidegge_r•s repor~,

following his investigation of the pure phenomena of man.

Heidegger

_h as cone luded that man, w.i thin his concrete being, can become aware
of his relatedness to Being as such, whether it is thereby affirmed
o~ rejected.

'Ihis condition of awareness Heidegger calls "existence"

(as differentiated from Dasein).18 Heidegger argues that·if one
muld question Being itself, he -~st approach a human being to do so.19
'lbe process of question_ing Dasein,

in order to relate it to Being

itself, is existential analysis.
t'lhile it is not necessary here for us to summarize all that
Heidegger ha·s found when thus addressing the human being, we must
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note that the possibilities of human existence ("existence" in
Heidegger's specific sense) can be fairly well established.

These

possibilities \'Ii. thin human existence, these "r,otentialities" ,-,hich
are capable of being "actualized,•,~ are called by Bultmann existen-:
tialia.

Bultmann is speaking·of such existentialia when he says.

"Bvery .o ntic experience (ns an experience of man) has the ontological
conditions of its possibility in the human structure and can therefore
be understood as possible on the basis of this structure. 11 20 He
refers to the "ontological conditions" as part of the "given" of
human structure.

.

It is just these "ontological conditions," the

existentialia, that existential analysis commits to the theologian
for his use as a framework in the questioning of Being itself.
'Ibe influence of this group of existentialia upon Bultmann's
view of language is profound.

Bultmann quotes Jacob Burckhardt's

view of language with approval:
At the peak of culture stands a spiritual miracle: the
languages whose origin lies in the soul independently of
an individual people and its individual language.21
He then goes on to say of himself:
lb be sure, I can know what light and life are even when it is
dark and I do not see anything. Bven the blind man knows t•!hat
light is ••• yet I do not i:eally know it. Por the blind man also
only really knows whflt light is when he sees, and the person who
is friendles~- and unloved only really knows what friendship and ·1ove
are when he finds a friend and is given love.22
Prom these reference\, it is safe· to say that Bultmann speaks of some
kindci' · archetypal symbols that are present in each man: (mirrors of
the existentialia discovered by existential analysis) which allow him
to develop concepts, and hence lanr,uage.

Nevertheless,Bultmann argues
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that man can not really know these archetypes to be valid unti~ he

has verified them through existential experience.

It is apparent,

then, that the existentialia discovered through existential analysis
(such as freedom, decision, possibility of e~cistence) are transferred
into the sphere of language as symbolic archetypes.

But these arche-

types are not real until they have been experienced as part of true
human existence; a verbal reference to the archetypes is not real
until the archetypes have been "lived through•.'!
Bultmann is prepared to suggest that the existentialia (and hence
the archetypes of language) discovered by existential analysis ·
through investigation of the phenomena of man are the tools with
which the Christian theologian must 1\IOrk.

For the basic Christian

concepts are nothing other than these very same existentialia:
All of the basic Christian concepts have a content that can
be determined ontologically prior to faith and in a purely
rational way. All theological concepts ·c ontain the understanding
of being that belongs to -man as such and by himself insofar as
he exists at a11.23
In order to appreciate Bultmann·' s transference of such existentialia
into the realm of Christian theology, it would be helpful for us to
compare how both he and Heidegger utilize the ontological condition
(existentiale) "self-understanding·.!' Commenting on Heidegger's and
Bultmann's "Selbstverstllnclniss," Ittel suggests that Heidegger can
speak of self-understanding only as Dasein recognizing the existential
possibility of Being within Dasein itself.

Bultmann, meanwhile,

admits this as a formal definition (an existentiale) 1 and can speak
of a self-understanding of sorts outside of faith; but he also speaks
of faith itself as self-understanding.24 We readily see how Bultmann
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takes over these existentialia, utilizes them as a formal category
of man's existence, and then goes on to fill them up with kerygmatic
•
meaning.

Bultmann is ready to admit that a similar transference occurs
in his utilization of Heidegger's "authentic possibility of being":

If ICuhlmann(sic) asks me, then, "Is the term •future' as
Bultmann's theology understands it identical with 'Nlat the
philosopher Heidegger discovers as •authentic possibility of
being'?," then I re~ly, Yes indeedl-namely, in a formal or
ontological sense.2S
Here Dul tmann refers to the existentialia as "formal.'.!
Bultmann is prep~red to utilize- existential interpretation.,
"the systematizing of the self-understanding of existence involved
in existence itself, 112 6 because it will enable him to accomplish his
goal of addressing Being from within the sphere of existence.

He

must utilize existential analysis if he hopes to remain true to his
commitment to carry on theology only in terms of man's existence.
Bultmann goes to the length of asserting that it is God's involvement
,dth man which gives to the existentialia such great significance.
In this regard, Malevez, the Jesuit, argues that for Bultmann the
complete existential analysis of Dasein is preparation for the kerygma.

Por the kerygma t«>uld be meaningless if man did not have some
"knowledge" of God beforehand.

~

If God ,1ere not secretly troubling

our existence, never ",«>uld man recognize God as God in any revelation
of God" (as Bultmann himself says in Bssays, p. 2S7). 27
Bultmann's usage of the existential analysis plays a dominant
role in the shaping of any view of language he might have.

Por it

appears that the existentialia are the very archetypes of language;
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they are t~e possibilities of authentic existence as they have been
characterized symbolically from the phenomena of existential analysis.
lbese archetypes are part of man's existence as it has been analyzed
by existential interpretation.

'Ibey are of the nature of potentials,

awaiting the actualization of the concrete moment of speech. And
just as the concrete moment will either affirm or deny the existentialia, so also it appears that any reference to the symbols of the
existentialia, the archetypes, ,fill automa~ically be either an autben.
tic or an unauthentic reference. It is impossible to speak of such
archetypes wi.tho~t one or the other reference • . We now turn to the
moment, the existentiell, as it assumes a role of importance in the
existential analysis.
Bultmann himself explains the difference between existential
possibility and existentiell:
Philosophical analysis shows what existence in the abstract
means. By contrast, existential, personal self-understanding
does not say ,-,1tat existence means· in the abstract, but points
to my life as a concrete person _in the here and now. It is an
act of understanding in •which my very self and the relationships
in wh~ch I am involved are understood together.28
Bultmann's differentiation between existentiell and existential possibilities is important.

.

All existentiell possibilities must lie within

the horizon of existe~tial possibilities·; but· there may be existential
possibilities which are not existentiell possibilities for a ·given
individual at a given time.29

For existentiell possibilities occur

only in the moment of concrete life, while existential possibi~ities
are the existentialia common to all human beings. Malevez reminds us
that in order to understand the existentiell ''moment" in Bultmann's
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usage, one must make ~he differentiation which Bultmann (from
Heidegger) makes between historiscb and geschichtllch_.

Histo~isch

belongs . to the spher~ which sets f o.rth and expounds objects in th.e
same way as it does nature.

There is a different kind of history,

Geschichte, with which we are to be concerned in Dasein.

Since it

has nothing to do with nature, a given, ready-made thing, it ·exists
only by.creating itself in a free decision.

"This decision is taken

in confrontation of the Being which encounters the human Being
existentielly." It is in such existentiell encounters, moments,
that man personalizes himself as apart from the objective.30
Bultma-n n's. own words, ·in Kerygma and Myt~, are:

"lfe possess the pre-

sent through encounter, and encounter imposes · the necessity of
decision. tt 31 It is evident that in Bultmann•·s "now, 11 the past as
wel~ as the future are subsumed.
.

'lbere is no meaning for either of

.

them when contrasted ,dth the present moment.32

'!be existentiell,

then, is the actualization of the potential inherent in exis-tentialia
possibilities.

The moment of concrete decision within existence

gives either an authentic or an unauthentic ring to the existential
. possibility.

lbe moment actually compresses th~ past and the future

in a decisive concrete situation.
Bultmann's discussion of "decisio·n now" can perhaps throw some
light onto his cir~le of language.

He suggests ·t hat decision rests

"in what at any given time I already am." As natur~l man, a man is
a sinner; that is, he is tied down more and.mo·re to_ what he already
is.

Bultma_nn further argues that the past is c_a·n stan·t ly called into
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question by the future in every meeting of the "now." A Christian
can make himself receptive to the future, "which is making itself
accessible in what confronts me 'now•. 1133 Is it unfair to suggest
that the language which arises in the moment of self-understanding
1'1ill be language with authentic referents for the archetype under

consideration existentiellI? Any_ other referents will be unauthentic.

\'lith any other procedure, the "moment" ,ri.11 not be the moment

of truth in which a Christian makes himself receptive to the future.
If the moment-decision proves itself unauthentic, that is, if man
will not face being within existence; then such a decision (or lack
of decision), failing to provide self-understanding, will itself provide the archetype (existentiale) ·w ith unauthentic referents from the
context of the concrete situation.

Por Bultmann has commented in

reply to Jaspers that when the "objectivity of what is said and the
subjectivity of the speaker" coincide, it is not due or attributable
to the "Enco1npassing," as Jaspers would argue; instead, it is due to
the Encounter and Summons which come to man in the historicity of
human existence, the "moment. 1134 Is this saying _other than that the
archetype is attributed with authentic referents from within the
surrounding concrete situation in the momentary decision?
Bultmann has enumerated some of the characteristics of that

"moment" which bestow true belief in God.

The moment cannot be

derived from anything; its potentialities for the future lie open;
its character and demand call for decision; it is rich in possibilities for joy and gratitude, pain and repentance, duty and love; it is
rich in "decision" possibilities, and in such decisions man either
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loses or gains· his real existence.3S Now we are at liberty to discuss
the M>rd "God" as it comes to light in the moment.

Por if the moment

provides insight and self-understanding, if it allows man to "gain his
· . real exist~nce," _then the a·rchetype nbeing" will receive authentic
referentsi the resultant ,«>~d will be uttered: "God"- nothing more
nor less than the archetype being.with authentic referents at the
moment.

For Bultmann defines truth as

the reality of God, and·the knowledge of it as the knowledge
of God ••• knowledge of "the moment," the ''moment" in coming
into contact with which Cbd's gift and God's demand, his
judgment and his grace meet us both as a call to action and
as a call to the acceptance of our destiny.36
Belief ~n ~d does not come as a result of insight from observation,
but it is born in truth from surrender to the claims of the moment.
"lb belief, God ·is t~e incomprehensible, enigmatic power that surges
through my concrete life and sets limits to it. 1137 The moment alone
provides the opportunity for a proper detacbm~nt from things; the
moment alone provides authentic referents from the sphere of concrete life for the archetype ''being," achieving, according to Bultmann,
a submission and acknowledgement that life is not "what I will, but
what thou wilt. 1138 'Ibis is to believe in God.
Bxistential analysis, then, provides a most interesting insight
into Bultmann's view of language.

It \«>uld be incorrect for us to

assume that Bultmann's view of language will be formed without recourse
to the process of existential analysis with its existenti•lia and
existentiell.

'lbe archetypes of language correspond to the existen-

tialia of human existence uncovered by existential analysis.

Just as

these existentialia can be either authenticated or not authenticated
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by the 111011lent of existentiell possibility, so it seems proper to
suggest that the symbolic archetypes will be given either authentic
or l,lrlauthentic referents,_ depending upon the decisive action of the
human being within the moment of the concrete situation.

Bither

consciously or unconsciously, Bultmann is beginning t~ provide us
with bis own view of authentic language as it arises from within. the
sphere of authentic existence.

We must now·turn to the question of

demythologizing as part of Bultmann's theology in order to see what
facets of his view of language this process will provide us.
"Demythologizing11 and "Bultmann" have been synonymous terms ever
since the appearance of "New Testament and Mythology" in 1941. It
is evident at the slightest study that demythologizing_follotvs necessari,

ly for Bultmann.

But he did not begin his
work ,dth demythologizing,
.
:-

and proceed from that point.

Rather, assuming the presupr,ositions

mentioned above, Bul~ann arrived at the process of demythol9gizing
.;as a natural consequent.

In this brief survey of the process of de-

mythologizing, we shall look firstly. at the modern world and modern
man as they provide the "concrete moment" for the process; then we shall
turn to the meaning of myth for Bultmann; finally we shall see that
. demythologizing demonstrates that meaningful language •~Y dea1_·only
with authentic being, in Bultmann's thought~
Bultmann finds within the order of modern man an ex post facto
rationalization for the process of demythologizing.

He characterized

modernity in the way that be did in order to make the process of
demythologizing more palatable to the preachers and the theologians
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were to read "New Testament and Mythology·;" and understand it as

Bultmann's ·first att·empt at anything like demythologizing.

For in

that essay, although not within his system with its presuppositions,
demythologizing begins with modern man. Modern man's advance in
science bas real~y been an advance in self-understanding related to
the world of things.

It would be foolish, Bultmann suggests, to ask

man to backtrack and visualize himself in the same crtde way as the
New Testament man considered himself related to the world in which
.he lived.

Bul~mann criticizes the New Testament world-view from

the position of modern science.

How much sense does a three-tiered

universe, the presence of spirits., and the contradictions inherent
in the New Testament, make to the _lllOdern mind?39 He calls attention

to the contradictory feature·s of the )lew· Testament, especially its
assertion that human life is controlled by cosmic forces, add. at the
same time challenged.to decision.40

Speaking of the death ~nd resurrec-

tion of Christ (which under gnostic. influence were transformed from
isolated facts which concerned Christ alone into a cosmic event
involving all.)-, . he remarks that
It is only with effort that modern man can think himself back
into such -an intellectual atmo~phere, and even then- he could
-n ever accept it himself, because it regards man's essential
being as nature, and redemption as a process of nature. 41 ·
Meanwhile, modern man's self-understanding has ovetster.,ped its
bounds.

It bas tripped over the husk of myth in the New Testament, and

shown no concern for the real stumbling-b-lock, the kernel of the
keryl!! which is in the New Testament.

Por man's self-understa~ding

has advanced to the idolatrous level of thinking of itself as

..

. . ..
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self-enclosed, self-subsistent.

("Modern man always makes use of

technical means which are the result of science ••• Nobody reckons with
direct intervention by ttanscendent pol'lers. 1142)

But there still is ·

hope; at least the ideas of God 1 s transcendence and of evil are signif~cant in the modern ,«:>rld, if only paritially:
'lbese mythological conceptions of heaven and hell are no longer
acceptable for modern men since for scientific thinking· to speak
of "above 11 or "belo,f'' in the universe has lost all meaning, but
the idea of the transcendence of God and of evil is still significant.43

lbe concern of the theologian who wants to make contact with modern
man and the modern world must center upon the entry of a transcendent

God.
The only relevant question for the theologian is the ·basic
assumption on which the adoption of a biological as of every
other Weltansch•uung rests, and that assumption is the view of
the 'l«>rld ,~1ich has been moulded by modern science and the
modern conception of human nature as a· self-subsiste_n t unity
Immune from the interference of supernatural powers.44
God's entrance into the world is the stumbling-block over which
modern man should fall, and not the cosmological and mythical features
of the New Testament as they attempt to describe God's entrance into
man's world rl existence.
With this introduction to modern man, ,te get a prelude of
Bultmann's demythologizing.

We cannot forget that he has committed

himself to speak of God only in terms of manis existence.

His concern

for demythologizing is a consequent of his existential interest rather
than a preliminary for it.

Por even before he begins his demythologi-

zing, we ~now that he will never speak of the transcendent God in •
and of Himself.
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In order to understand demythologizing, it is advisable for
us to determine what Bultmann means by the woxd ''myth." It is not
easy to perform such a task, for Bultmann has at least two meanings
for the word myth. At one time he defines myth and ''mythological" as
a view of the ~orld which uses imagerv "to express the other-worldly
in terms of this world, and the divine in te~s of human life, the
other side in terms of this- side. 1145 'Ibis definition of myth·seems
to be the one generally employed among scholars of ,«>rld religions,
even in the study of the Old Testament. At another occasion, Bultmann
refers to myth as a view ,fhich leaves room for extra and supermundane
I

interventions, in contrast to the ·modern world view "1hich postulates
a closed system of cause and effect.46 ·'lbese two definitions are
at variance.

While the first defines myth in terms of its content,

the second attempts the definition with the intention of myth as its
primary consideration.

The first definition is exemplified in Bultmann's

delineation between ''myth" and "legend": myth refers to the central .
Christian story of incarna.tion, atonement, resurrection, and exaltation represented as a cosmic drama of redemption (this is the content
of myth); legend is used to refer to peripheral stories and anecdotes
~ch serve to illustrate aspec_ts of the central myth (that is, aspects
of its content).47 Bultmann is prepared to retain myth if it is defined in the second method above; but he asserts that the purpose of myth_
in the New Testament (that is, its attempt to speak of the transcendent God's intervention in human existence) has been impeded by the
terms of the myth: ''The real purpose of myth is to speak of a transcen.;.
dent ppwer which controls the world and man, but that purpose is

2S

impeded and obscured by the terms in which it is expressed. 1148
Bultmann -w ill not quarrel with the true intention of myth; he
quarrels with myth when it attempts to picture the -,«>rld;

1he real

11

purpose of myth is not to present an objective picture of the world
as it is, but to express man's understanding· of himself in the world
in which he lives. 1149 lbere is reason, then, for the charges ,fhich
have been brought against Bultmann, suggesting that bis definition
of myth is incoherent.

Hepburn suggests that Bultmann's definition

is wide enough to include all pi•c torial, analogical, and symbolicai
speech; H.P. Owen says that Bultmann has selected this term to desig-

.

nate a very heterogeneous colleciion of items in the New Testament,
.

''meaningless elements," but items that are very unlike each other.SO

.

Lohmeyer argues that Bultmann's· definition of ''myth.. is too narrow;
for myth revolves -around the wealth ,of .relations:·between God and the
world no less than between God a.nd man, and in such a context,
demythologizing is impossible.51 These_charges of inconsistency in
.
Bultmann's definition of ''myth" stem from a failure to grasp Bultmann's
differentiation between the outward form and content of myth, and the
int~ntion of myth.
1be ~:f:~11~~ to define ''myth" is for Bultmann an exercise in
authentic language.

Por he argues that there is a proper myth when

its intention is to express man's understanding of himself in the
M>rld in which he lives, just as there is an improper (unaut~entic~
myth when myth assumes as its purpose to present an objective picture of the world .as it is. Myth in its proper sense, then, is to
be equated with the linguistic archetype of self-understanding•. ·
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My-th _in_its improper sense is the process of a ttributi~g to this
.

.

archetype referents which are unauthentic, and therefore of a
subject-object form.

With these definitions at hand, we turn to the

actual process of cle~ythologizing.
It is apparent that Bultmann's process of demythologizing
emerges -from his existential analysis.

If it is assumed that all

thought in the New Testament must serve self-understanding, then any
other material will be myth in the improper sense; it is unnecessary

He (Bultmann)' says explicitly that only the existential elements
in the New Testament can be accepted4' Yet they are claimed. to .
be the fulfilment of our natural ~elf-knowledge; it must be
clear that they correspo·nd to a latent possibility. in the human
Dasein. But ,,hy? Because, if-:one of .t_h ese existential elements,
revealed by the analysis of e~istential philosophy, fails to
meet a human situation, then these existential elements in the
New Testament must rightly be call~d ''mythical," an irruption
of the divine into the human realm, which is inadmissible, it
is a violent rupture-like that of a miracle-of the conditions
of our· existence; then, fundamentally they themselves would no
longer be existentia1.s2
Por Bultmann, the process of demythologizing is less a method of
depleting the text than it is a hermeneutical method.
This method ofinterpretation of the New Testament which tries
to recover the deeper meaning behind the mythological conceptions
I call de-mythologizing-an unsatisf ac.tory 1«>rd, to be sure.
Its aim is not to eliminate the mythological statements but to
interpret them. It is a method of hermeneutics.53
: ·.·.=.utilizing the view of language which so far has emerged from
Bultmann's theology, we suggest that demythologizing is the process
of·providing the archetype "self-understanding" with the maximmu
number of lucidly authentic referents.

For any concept ,mich fails

to verify authentically this self-understanding can certainly not be
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the Word of God:
'!be touchstone of a Christian concept's authenticity will be its
correspondence with .some existential structure of Dasein; any
concept devoid of correspondence is certainly not the Word of
God, not that \'lord which, since it calls upon man, can only
concern in him what constitutes him existentially. 54
In t«>rking with the Word of God, it is the purpose of the exegete to
"discover whether the New Testament offers man an understanding of
himself \•Jhich will challenge him to a genuine existential decision • ..ss
!fllatever does not contribute to that challenge is not an authentic
referent to the archetype "self-understanding, 11 and hence must be
called unauthentic and valueless.

Self-understanding,is authentically

verified in the New Testament by belief in Christ, and this is proper
myth; but belief in Christ "does not mean considering the miracle
stories of the New Testament to be true, 1156 for that is improper
myth, unauthentic reference, unnecessary baggage.
Mythological language is not distasteful to Bultmann because it
speaks of God obliquely; mythical statements are rejected because they
are constructed so as'.1x>· have the grammatical and logical form of

scientific statements, and as a consequence are open to scientific
criticism.

Instead of· preserving the "i.nfinite .qualitative difference"

between God and:.the,10rld, myth so represents God that He seems to be
one more item within the world. 57

If' improper myth pictures God as

quantitatively rather than qualitatively different from. the world,
then a failure to demythologize is no less a sin than asserting

unauthentic referents for the archetype "self-understanding." In
essence, to demythologize is to carry on the same task as did Luther
in the Reformation:
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.Demythologizing is the radical application of the doctrine of
justification by faith to the sphere of knowledge and thought.
Like the doctrine of justification, demythologizing destroys
every longing for security. There is no difference between
security based on good ,,x,rks and security built on objectifying
knowledge.SB
Demythologizing provides us ,1i th a microscopic view of Bultmann's
vi_ew of language.

He does not aim to demythologize when myth is

understood proper_ly as self-understanding expressing itself.

Just

as it is his purpose not to eliminate proper mythological statements,
but to interpret them through a valid hermeneutics; so it is his purpose not to eliminate the symbolic archetype "self-understanding,"
but to attribute to it authentic referents in the moment of decision.
Just as he will retain in the process of demythologizing any statement
which will throw light upon self-understanding (such as freedom,
decision, forgetting the past); so also he ,dll retain as valuable
,ri.thin his language those archetypes which, though subsumed to the
major archetype of self-understanding, are contributory towards a
more excellent self-understanding.

'lb.e parallelism between one

aspect of Bultmann's vielf of language as it has thus far emerged
(archetypes modified and validated by authentic referents) and his
definition of a proper myth; and between the other aspect of his view
of language (archetypes deprived of any possible meaning by unauthentic referents, objective in form) ·and his definition of an improper
myth as an attempt at describing the world objectively-this parallelism is more than a mere co-incidence.

For the proc_e ss of demythol-

ogizing dem~nstrates t~at for him language can h~ve only the proper
function of attributing authentic instead on unauthentic referents
to the archetypal forms.
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Demythologizing is carried on in order to reach that iford of the
New ~stament which produces the greatest amount of self-understanding.
lbe ~e.ryea is that element which P,rovides the maximum of
self-understanding and self-realization- in man.
posed of~ segments:

As such it is coa-

self-understanding of one's past (with

consequent judgment of the past), and self-realization for the future
(through grace and revelation).

In ·~.sss~eace, then, the language of

kery;S!!! is taking the archetype "self-understanding" (discovered as
one of the existentialia by existential analysis) and amplifying it
two ways:

it is eliminating the unauthentic referents; it is

accomplishing this task by contrasting them with authentic referents.
'lbe first is judgment in Bultmann's theology; the second is grace.
n, the kerYP!! in these tl«> aspects we now turn.

Utilizing the view of language wbi.ch has thus far emerged, we
may s~gest that sin is the ascription of the unauthentic referents

of self-subsistence, complete self-assertion, and unwillingness to
surrender, to the symbolic archetype of self-understanding.

Bultmann

says that sin is··se1f-assertioa.S9 He calls sin "the claim of man
to seek to exist in his own right, to be his own master, and to
.take his life into his own hands. 1160 Looking at sin in its relation
to self-understanding, we note that Bultmann's conception of sin is
really a lack of self-realization, just as salvation is

'

..
,

self-realization. 61 Bultmann utilizes the existential term Angst
to clarify .t he crux:·of sin:
towards the future?

"What is it, if sin is unresponsiveness

It is dread, the dread of the man who is unwil-

ling to surrender to what is a mystery to him ••• It is dread of God
• and so revolt against God. n6 2
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It would be meaningless for Bultmann to describe the Pall as
an objective fact of history; ~he Pall is actually sin in its
durative aspect.

"'!be only reasonable attitude for man to adopt

apart from Christ is one of despair, to despair of the possibility
of his ever achieving authentic Being. 116 3
of the Pall for Bultmann.

lbis ls a basic definition

Nonetheless, there is a difference between

Bultmann's interpretation of the Pall and the approach of the pbilosaphy of existentialism. Malevez notes that although existential.
analysis does not ignore the Pall, it does not appreciate its depth.
Existentialism trusts that its knowledge of authentic existence
brings with it the ability to accomplish this existence (so-called
Socratic fallacy).

But the New Testament argues that man ~annot

attain such authentic existence, according to Bultmann, man bas lost
all po\fer to do so.

In fact, the New Testament blames man for

insisting upon his ability to reach the authentic life; . what he needs
to do is to surrender.64 'Dle surrender of the keryp.a is our next
item of consideration.
Grace and revelation are the two constitutive elements of the
kerYS!!•
...

'lbe event, when viewed as grace, is conceived as bringing

man to his authentic existence; when viewed as revelation, it is the
impartation of some kind of knowledge or understanding.65

Prom the

linguistic angle, when ~be event is viewed as grace, the archetype
is authentic existence; when the event is viewed as: revelation or
knowledge, the archetype is complete self-understanding and total
self-realization.

In any event, although the archetype "authentic
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existence"· is i ·n telligible to existential analysis, it remains to be
seen whether or not man can attain such authentic existence by himself.
Macquarrie remarks,
Pallen man, just because he is still man, has an existential
possibJlity of authenticity, but this may not be an existentiell
possibility for any given individual in .a particular situation.
It nay requir~ a gracious act from be ond. hims~lf to make ·the
possibility one th ich he can choose. 6
·

6

Malevez notes that Bultmann is not without ,dtness _in this
matter.

Por Bultmann asserts that while philosophy can becane aware

of authentic nature, it cannot achieve the same. Malevez interprets
Bultmann's thought as follows:
Philosophy retains the conviction that once man becomes aware
of his "authentic" nature, he will be able to r~alize it; in
short, ·philosophy is convinced that it alone can disentangle
the true being of man and thus set it free to make the act of
surrender •••Prom the New 'n!stament point of view an act of
divine love alone can save us; indeed, it is not too much to
say that the Christian message ·is not primarily ·a doctrine ·of
the nature of our "authentic existence," but the proclamation
of the saving act, the saving event, which is accomplished in
Christ. 6-7
· ·
·
·
'Ibis is an essential difference between Bultmann and the philosophy
of existential analysis.

John Macquarrie summarizes Bultmann's

differences ·with existentialism succinctly:
Bultmann feels himself obliged to part company with the
philosopher and to take a different path. He maintains that
the fallen nature of man alienates him so radically from his
authentic existence that tho.ugh he may conceive it, he cannot
of himself attain it. Only an act of grace from beyond man
himself can put the possibility of his true life within his
grasp; and Bultmann, ~f course, claims· ·that·•Christian faith
does kno,, of ·such a gracious act. This act lies beyond the
horlzans·-: of"existential analysis. It is God's decisive act in
Christ, as proclaimed in the kerygma.68
1

Ittel spealcs of Bultmann's differences with the existentialists by
referring to the concept of guilt as common ground for both; he shows

..
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hm Bultmann and Heldegger di~agree in interpreting this human factor:

Wie bei He1degger, so zeigt auch bei Bultmann der Ruf die Schuld
des Menschen auf. Nur ist eben der Unterscheid der, dass bei
Heidegger der Mensch diese seine Schuld in Bntschlossenheit auf
sich a.ebmen muss, da ihn seine radikale Bigenmlchtigkeit blind
macht gegenllber der Tatsache, dass er seine Bxistenz als Geschenk
betrachten kann. Dies aber tut der Mensch des Neuen Testamentes
und erlangt ·. somi t Vergebung se'iner SUnde als Bef reiung wn
seiner Bigenmlchtigkeit.69

If it is true that Bultmann's man, as distinguished from the
philosophers', does not have the grace to reach authentic existence
in and of himself, then it will take a Word from God for such a procedure.

~n a real sense the kerygma, as God's gracious l'lord, attributes

to the archetype "self-understanding" authentic referents which are
the act of God.

In spite of Bultmann's attempt to speak of all of

theology in terms of man's existence, it appears that these •uthenticating referents are human referents more to the degree that they
formulate

.

a

possibility for man than to the degree that they describe

a pre-existent authentic referent ~n man's capacity and nature.
\fllile Bultmann does not hesitate to speak of grace as the event
~ich brings authentic existence, he _prefe_rs to view the keryp~ as
the encountering revelation which imparts complete self-understanding
of the past and future within the present moment.

'Ibis is in keeping

. with his announced intention of relating all theology to the
· self-understanding of man.

It is to the kerygma as it encounters

. ·m an's self-understanding with enlightening revelation that we now
turn.
Bultmann asserts that to become a Christian is to pass judgment
on one's past, and·· to see the future as endless possibility:

'Dle

man who becomes a Christian "experiences an encounter which presents
him with the possibility of decision against his old self and in
favor ·of his new sel.f'~ -He does experience this encounter in hearing
the Word o( divine grace.~•70 The- revealing grace of the kerypa
shows man that he is bound to himself.

Authentic life and complete

self-understanding will result only when man is delivered from himself.
"It is the claim of the Ne" Testament that .1:&is .~:ls·.·exact.1-y· what: has
happened.

This is precisely the meaning of ,mat was wrought in

Christ. 1171 Forgiveness of sins has a rather familiar and orthodox
ring · when we hea-r Bultmann define it. as "simply the obliteration of
man•·s past, and taking him to be what he is no~the man of the
future; it means relieving him of dread and thereby making him free
for the future. 1172 But any hint at orthodoxy vanishes when he goes
on to describe how the forgiveness of sins was accomplished.

'lbe

cross, it is true, "has created a ne,v and permanent situation in
history. 1173 But the cross is not the cross of the Creed.

Por the

cross really me11ns "to make the cross .o ur own, to undergo crucifixion
,vith him. 1174 And the preaching of .the cross is. called the event of
redemption:

"'!be preaching of the cross as the event of redemption
.

.

challenges a~l who hear i -t .to appropriate this significance for
themselves, to be willing to be crucified with Chri~t.:7S Maleve•
sUD111arizes Bultmann's teaching on the cross thus:

"In the cross of

Jesus, in some .way, within time, God achieved the liberating judpent
which

He

passes ab aeterno upon our existence ••• '111e cross ••• lifts us

to the
. plane of . authentic existenc~."~6 Man now has complete
.

self-understanding in the moment. Man's understanding of existence
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at that 1110ment, Bultmann reminds us, need not be conscious; nevertheless, it makes its effect known.

"It permeates and controls imper.:.

ceptibly all atL~iety and resolve, all the joy and dread, and is called
in question at every encounter. 1177
If we viel\f this segment of the kerygm.a from a linguistic angle,

and attempt to visualize how the self-understanding which comes
through the Word of the cross is rela_ted to Bultmann's view of language,
we shall find some interesting developments.

Por now the archetype

"self-understanding" (or, viewed another way, "authentic existence•,

has kerygmatic acts-of-God as authentic referents; included among

these referents is man's deliverance from Himself through God's
gracious act of the cross (through obliteration of man's past) for
future freedom in which man is no longer conditioned by past decisions.
In a real sense, then, God takes active part in attributing authentic

re~erents gleaned from man's concrete situation to the archetype
"self-understanding." Is it so odd that this process should be any-

thing other than God's "\'lord"?

God's procedure in authenticating

the existence of man is called an "act"; but the vehicle nearest the
.
act, which is selected to make these acts meaningful to man, is God's
Word.

The fact that Bultmann makes no differentiation between God's

act in Christ, and the Word of that act preached today,

demonstrates

a metaphysical affinity between the action of God and language as it

is viewed by Bultmann.

The Word which speaks, and the action about

which it speaks, are in$eparable; in fact, they are one and the same

for Bultmann.

We shall examine this aspect in greater detail shortly.
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At present, we shall determine how Bultmann handles the ~esurrection in· his_ theology of the kerygma.
••_.Obviously it is not an event of
~aning. 11'-8

"But .what of the ~e$i.-rrection?

past

history with self-evident .

What thetti~.!the resur-r_ection?

The story of the resurrec~

tion i _s the first ~tness -to _the power· of Christ's crucifixion ·tQ
bestow authentic existence. -The resurrection, preached·. by the first
apostles, was God's way of saying that the cross of Christ was the
Thus understood, the

·empowering medium to ·a uthentic existence.

resurrection was not formally ·a part of the Chrlst-e.v ent; neither was
'

•

!

it one of the authentic referents, ' one of the acts of God.

Rather_,

.the -·r esurrection as· preached was. witness to the validity of God• s
proce·ss
of attributing authentic
referents
to the ~rchetype "authentic
.
.
.
existence.'!

?he resurrect-ion,. ~s preached, was the vall~ating word

for ali- that had happened .b efore, ~t.

"The _faith ·of Baster is just

this~faith in the· word of preacbing. 1179. Malevez. ciears the air in
descr_ibing the res_u i're~tion as _a ''mythical storyi• when he s11moarizes
_Bultmann's.teaching of the ~esurrecti'on:
.

.

.

God created the belief in the Resurrec-tlon in the minds of the
disciples ••• in the guise of a mythical story,· the true divine
content .which God poured into their.hearts was, quite simply,
the knowledge of the triumphant value of the .Cross, the discover
of ·its. saving significance, the grasp of its liberating aspec·t . 8

0

'Ibis discussion of the resurrection.as the first kerygmatic
proc~amation·· leads us- into a consideration of proclamation within the
moment as the ·very "•ct of God."

Por if the cross of Christ, and all

of _God's ·ac.t s as well, are understood linguis_tically .as God attributi~g
authentic referents tQ the archetype "self-understanding," we may .
c~nclude that.only an act of God can attribute authentic ·referents to·
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such an archetype.

If this is the case, then all proclamation will

have to be an act of God; the kerypa will .be God acting.
alone can attribute the authentic referents.

Por He

All preaching, if it

is the act of God, will have as -".its ·purpose the actualization of the
archetype "self-understanding.n For according to Bultmann, proclamation does not communicate something that happened in a certain place
-and at a certain time, "but rather says what has occurred to the
person being addressed.·1181 If :·prea~hing is the actualization of
self-understanding, as an act of God, "the preaching is itself
revelation and does not merely speak about it, so that it mediates
a content that one can understand or to which he can relate himself
through knowledge and thereby 'have' the revelation. 1182
In addition, all preaching will be momentous and concretej that
is, it will consider decisive possibilities within man in the concrete
existential situation.

God's active referents to the archetype

"self-understanding" will confront me within my present situation.
Existential timing is an important factor in making a "Word" relevant.
For example, a word yesterday may have been meaningless until it
becomes a decisive ,,iord for me now, in

my

presen·t situation. 83 Such

a momentous proclamation can be consideredas:-.part and parcel of God's
gracious revelational act of salvation:

"As the preaching itself

belongs to the fact of salvation, so also js·:this fact not what it is
without preaching. 1184
It is within the proclamation of the kerygma that man receives
the full revelation of self-understanding. · It is within the proclamation
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of the kerygma that man can see authentic existence. - And_ just as the
existentialist philosophers claim to be able to address and question
existence and thereby come into contact with being itself, so the
momentous kerygmatic proclamation will enable Christian man to
appropriate the proper authen~ic referents to the archetype_ "being
itself."

For the keryF! will bring to self-realization man's

self-understanding as it is related to the transcendent, acting God,
who speaks the Word.

Bultmann's theology runs from the kerygmatic

word, to Christology, to God J-Umself.

Bultmann first associates

Christ and the word of revelation in a concise manner:

"Christ is

revelation, and ••• revelation is the 1«>rd; for these t,.o are one and
the same. 1185

Then Bultmann asserts that theology can only

sketched in terms of Christology.86
answer:

be

We ask why, and surmise the

Christ is God's meaningful l~rd spoken to man in terms

that he can understand.

Por that reason we are to construct a

theology through Christology.

In spite of himself, Bultmann agrees

to discuss some of the "attributes" of God, never failing to relate
them to man's existence in some way (and thereby abiding by his
intention to arr-~ve at theology only through kerymatic Christology).
Bultmann describes God's transcendence in terms nearly unacceptable
to his own system of thought:
God's transcendence is rathet" his constant futurity, his
absolute freedom, which ••• excludes every laying hold on God by
man, every constraining on or obligation on the part of God by
the fulfillment of conditions which men can perform, every claim
upon God ••• every rational comprehensibility of the divine action.87
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In another ·p lace, he proceeds to describe God's transcendence in
terms more palatable to one who would make all theology dependent
~on man's existence.

Por God's . transcendence is not that into ~ich

the soul is absorbed as it soars above the world in devo·tion,_ abstraction and ecstasy.

Rather, _His transcendence ·is apprehended by the

believer as the "preservation of detachment in the actual concrete
situations··.of: 1ife-a detachment ·which makes decisions:and actions of
real import, because in it man thinks and acts as a free agent.i,88
'lbe attribute of God's omnipote·nce-·: is taken seriously in the \i>rd
of divine grace, which \'lord (kerzea). liberates man from himself.
with po,.er.89 God's judgment is taken seriously in the Word of divine
grace (His holiness), when man's finitude is seen "with all its logical implications as sin."

It unmasks the "dignity of man as

self-deception. ••90 God's eternity is taken seriously in the Word of
God, for this is a Word of forgiveness.

"As the man whom God has

·forgiven ••• man is •in his real being, his existence is no longer a
transient one ••• 'l'hat 18:sbo,m in the cessation of all self-glorification. 1191
Returning to our consideration of the kerygmatic proclamation,.
it is well for us to note that th~ lerypa draws the past and the

future into the ·eschatological present.

For the kerypa is the

"once-for-all eschatological event, which is continually re-enacted
in the word of proclamation. 1192 In other \fl>rds 1 the apostolic preaching
which originated in the event of Baster Day is itself a part of the
eschatological event

of

redemption.93 It is apparent that Bultmann

has collapsed the kerymatic act into the eschato1ogical present so as
to retain his existential emphasis upo·n decision· in the moment.
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Another important service rendered by contemporary kerygmatic
proclamation is its bracketing function.

Por Bultmann correlates

its role with that of ''death" within existentialism.

He asserts that

in the system of existential analysis, the phenomenon of death serves
the following p~poses:

(A) death provides terms by which existential

analysis can understand man in his totality;

(B)

death limits man from

the outside (a ·° limitation which man himself is not capable of providing); (C) death prevents man from. idle speculation about "something
outside of man"; (D) death constitutes man as a totality within his
existence.

Bultmann then goes on to state that theology "gives this

function to the proclamation that is encountered in existence."94
Ju$t as death within existential analysis clarifies the ontological
s-tructur~, thereby adjusting the exi.stentialia, so now proclamation
is given the task of adjusting these same existentialia in a range
of value, demonstrating their inherent dependence upon self-understanding
and authentic existence.

Since our interest is Bultmann's view of

language, we must ask the rhetorical question here:

Does not preachi~g

also adjust the archetypes of language in proclamation? Does it not ·
fit •the archetypes in their relation to the major ,rchetypes of
self-understanding and authentic existence?

Does it not simultaneously

reject unauthent~~ _referents, and postulate·God-act referents?
It is self-evident that.within Bultmann's system th~re can be
no ·revelation of- God outside of the kerygma.

for revelation is . ,: ·.

actually God's attributing of authentic referents to the archetype
of self-understanding.

~ith such a limited definition, Bultmann has

delimited all revelation to the kerygma.

For the ke~ygma accomplishes

39

what man in self-assertive sin did.-mt accomplish, although it was
within the will of God when He created the ,mrld:
:Man·1earns to understand himself in the light of the revelation of redemption not a bit differently than he always already
should understand-himself in the face of the revelation in
creation and law-namely, as God's creature who is limited by
·God and stands under God's claim••• If the re,,elation in Jesus
means salvation as an understanding of oneself in him, then the
revelation in creation meant nothing other than. this understanding of oneself in God in the knowledge of one's own creatureliness.95
Any talking "about" God that lies outside of the kerygma is merely
the ascription of unauthentic referents to the archetypes of
self-understanding and authentic existence; we recall that only these
two (really one and the same) archetypes are able to burst forth into
the light of being itself.

Bultmann asserts that before

to discuss the validity of natural revelation,
authenticity of the word "God. tt96

,1e

,1e

can begin

must arrive at the

A Christian who believes solely

in revelation through Christ cannot stand idly by while others assert

that "God" manifests himself in ~atural revelation.

"\'le must adhere

to the view that the criterion for the critical investi~,;ation of any
ltnowledge of God allege,tly g~ined elsewhere is the knowledge of God

which belongs to the Christian faith. 11 97

For the Christian, revela-

tion means recognizing his o,·m authenticity:

The meaning of revelation consists in its being the means
whereby~~ achieve our own authenticity, which we cannot
achieve by our own resources. Therefore, to know about revelation means to know about our own authenticity~ and at the
same time, thereby to know our own limitation.98
But it is precisely this limitation which those who espouse natural
revelation will not admit.

They have failed to perceive the things

thnt can be kno\lm about God in their existence.

Instead, Bultmann
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argues that they have turned the "negatives" ·c ollected into positive
statenients abnut the ontological God. 99

Is it incorrect for us to

assert that the "negatives" which the supporters of natural revelation transform \into positive statements about the ontological Goci are
other than unauthentic referents to the archetype "authentic existence"
summarized in objective statements?

Such -"revelation" is thus unauthen-

tic langunge, just as it is also sin for Bultmann.
!laving dealt with Bultmann's theology insofar as it concerns itself
with presuppositions, existential analysis, :demythologizing, and the

e~clusive kerygma, we shall turn to one final area of his theology in
our attempt to discern what view of language emerges.
faith as it is immune from proof and disproof.

~\'e shall consider

Bultmann is concerned

with removing faith from the sphere of objective knowledge.

He asserts

that ."it is precisely its immunity from proof which secures the Christian proclamation from the charge of being mytholo.g ica111 ·. (in the imprope~
sense).100 He remembers vividly those ~imes in the Church's history
when faith was shattered because it had been improperly based upon the
tenets of a fluctuating knowledge of science.

Faith needs to be emanci-

pated from its association with a l«>rld of objective terms.101 If the
acts of God are not susceptible to the justifiable criticisms of
science,102 then faith too must lie beyond their rea~h.103
B:ultmann's definit.ieli of faith is interested primarily -in the
future.

"This is what is meant by 'faith': to open ourselves to the

future ••• turning our backs on self and abandoning all security •••
surrendering all our self-confidence. nl04 . Belief is response t~ that

gift of God in which all of the future is bestowed upon man in
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anticipation, and the acceptance of which makes man free again to accept
any destiny: "Belief mea_n s, as the anticipation of every possible. future,
that -taking of man out of the world, and his ingrafting into eschatological existence. •~105

If faith is such an eschatological ingrafting,

it is not a quality which inheres in a believer, but rather a possibility
that must constant~y be laid hold of anew-as this is the only way that
man exists.106

The repeated proclamations of the kerygma necessary

to

nurture

faith preserve it from falling into the sphere of objective knowledge.
Faith cannot be proven.

is spoken and ·p roclaimed.

When it is spoken about, the kerygma itself
Just as tile historian Bultmann can "only

discover various instances of faith in revelation, never (instances)
of the revelation itself, 11107 so also the theologian Bultmann is never
able to discover in the present moment faith in and of itself, but

only the revelation of the keryea.
the kerygma that gives it life.

Faith, then, is inseparable from

It is momentous, and its concern·: for

possibilities in the future flo11JS from its decisive authenticity in
the present.

It is beyond proof, for it deals with a God who is Quali-

tatively different from the objective

l\lOrld.

Paith is self-understanding

with the authentic referents "possible future of freedom" and "obliteration of past sins" attributed to it.

CIIAP'mR III .

BUL'JMANN' S VIBW OP 'DIBOLOG[CAL LAN(IJAGB

Language as a Process of Authentic Bxistence
In this chapter we propose to tie together those aspects of

lansuage which have coae to the fore in our canalderation of Bultlllann•a
theology.

We shall first examine the constructs of a view of language

which have emerged from bis theology. 'lben we shall formulate a
working definition of language as it can be described for Bultmann.
Pinally, we shall exb.ibi t his view of language as evidenced in a

sermon preached in 1943.
Bultmann's view of language must be filtered froa hie theology.
Por he provides us with no clear and concise statements•• to llbat

language is, or how it works, or where it connects with theology.
In our theological consideration above, we discussed the undergirding
assumptions of his thought; we attempted to catch the spirit of
existential analysis, both in its existentlale and exlstentiell
moments; we have seen the process of demythologizing as a sequential
aspect of Bultmann's theology; we have characterized the kerypatic
proclamation as God's act of affirmins man's existence in true

authenticity. All through the investigation we caught glimpses of
an emerging view of language and the presuppositions which undergird
it. How we shall isolate those presuppositions of Bultmann's view
of language. '1'hese assumptions need to be considered when tbe time
comes to formulate Bultmann's view of language. 'lbere are six basic
assumptions.

-

"t.
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l'he first assumption for Bultmann's view of language derives
from one of his basic theological assumption.

Only that is meaning-

ful (linguistically) which increases self-understanding.

If the

bedrock of B~ltmann•s theology is the assumption that all theological endeavor is carried on in terms of man•s existence (i.e.
self-understanding), then this basic assumption must be considered
as a correlative aspect of his view of language.

Bvery linguistic

expression (theological) will aid, in some way or another, man's
self-urderstanding.

'lbis assumption already alerts us to the usage

of the archetypes suggested in existential analysis, and the authentic referen~s as well.
'lbe second assumption deals with the process of existential
analysis.

If existential analysis is granted the privilege of

determining the existentialia which are to be actualized in the
existentiell moment, then any theory of language will take into
consideration this same existential analysis, as ·:well as the results
it provides.

It is safe to assert that the process of existential

analysis provides "neutral" archetypes of a symbolic nature.

All

meaningful language will be connected in some -way or another with
these archetypes and with their referents.
In considering the third major assumption of Bultmann's view
of language as it issues from his theology, it is necessary for us
to recognize again the affiliation of Bultmann and Heidegger.

'!be

proximity of their approach to language should not be overlooked.
Bven though Bultmann has remained hesitant, it is a valid procedure
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to utilize what Heidegger has provided as suggestive of Bultmann's
approach. Macquarrie notes that Heidegger's view of language is
set aside by the modern logical positivists. In describing their
rejection, he gives us a glimpse of Heidegger's view of language,
especially his view of the origin of language:
Certainly there is little tendency to accept Heidegger's view
that language is to be understood primarily in terms of man as
the bei-ng who has the existential possibility of discourse •••
Yet there are other kinds of language in which man expresses
himself-and religious language is surely among them--where
the relation between what is said ard the person Who says it
is so close that any linguistic analysis would need to be
correlated with an existential analysis. 1
Bultmann approximates such a position himself when he says, "Language
is a mirror of the mode of thinking. 112 Language is not from the
"thinking subject." but from the mode of thinking.

Language results

from tbe self's involvement with the world and with other selves.

Th speak precisely, our third assumption is that language must be
an act of authentic existence in Bultmann's thought, if it is to be
meaningful. Language must at least pattern itself after tbe whole
·terygmatic process, the process which brings self-understanding and
authentic existence to realization.
It is not improper to draw a parallel between Bultmann's hermeneutics and his theory of language in this consideration.

His henaeneutics

suggest that the question of Goel and the question of myself are identical.

This is the "receptive" side of theology.

On the "expressive"

side, language about God and language about myself are also identical.
Any language of the "expressive" type arises from. within the authentic
existence which it attempts to portray.

Por Bultmann, there is one
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basic presupposition underlying all interpretation: "'lhe presupposition
for umerstandlag is the interpreter's relationsbip in bis life to the
subject which ls directly or indirectly expressed in the text."3
Surely this principle of interpretation must underlie any attempt at
the symbolic interpretation of authentic existence as one seeks to

portray it. Language is an act of authentic existence, just as
interpretation depends upon the authentic relation one has with the
subject he is attempting to interpret.
Q>nnected with the assumption that language finds its origin

in authentic existence is a consideration of the function of language.
Language can never serve the subject-object function of formulation
for Bultmann if it is to remain meaningful.
speech's sake.

Speech will never be for

If it is authentic language, it will be kerygmatic,

and hence a form of s1.a11ons.

In considering the intention of theologi-

cal statements for Bultmann, Ogden submits that their function "is to
present a certain possibility for understanding hU1118n existence, and
directly or indirectly to

SlBIIIDOD

their hearers to realize this

possibillty. 114
Noting the prominence which the terypa plays in Bultmann's
theology, we do not overstate the case in asserting the .fourth
assumption to be that the kerIP!! serves as primary example of
meaningful language. Our analysis of the kerye, insofar as it is
God's act proclaimed and God's act in proclaiming, will hold us in
aood stead when it comes to evaluating theological discourse.

it will provide us with a measuring stick.

Por
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'lbe fifth assumption deals with the role of demythologizing in
Bultmann's view of language.

Demythologizing plays only a subsequent

role in Bultmann's view of language, just as it has in his theology.
Demythologizing cannot serve as anything other than an example of
meaningless language in the process of receiving meaning. Once again
it would be well for us to notice the simil~rity between Heidegger

and Bultmann.

lars\en Harries bas analyzed Heidegger's usage of

language as follows: Heidegger attempts to diminish the danger of
seeing Sein as another Seinedes by using a language which is devoid
of pictures.

flor pictures belong to the realm of finite objects and

can block our vision of the ontological.

But finally, such an attempt

If we strive to reach Bei.ng, we

cannot prove satisfactory.

■ust

find

a language which is able to single out its own inadequac,~-5 It is

apparent that Bultmann has followed nearly the same process in his
demythologizing.

In his grasp for being, be bas be·gun with a language

which he thinks is able to point out its own inadequacy, the language
of existential analysis.

Starting from that point, he has proceeded

to subract those pictures of

Rew

Testament language which, to his

eye, describe Sein as another Seinedes.

But the important factor to

be noted is that Bultmann begins first with the language of being as
the proper expression of trut~; from there be proceeds to demythologize.
In bis view of language, demythologizing follows, but does not give

genesis to, man's symbolic expression of encounter with being.
lbe sixth assumption deals with Bultmann's disapproval of any

subject-object ·formulations.

He terms such subject-object formula-

tions "meaningless. 11 The sixth assuaJJtion is that an objective
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formulation, linguistically, is nothing less than the positing of
unauthentic referents.

Such unauthentic referents conceal the real

nature of Sein because they objectivize it.

1b objectivize is to

place one among many; this is the same process as positing unauthentic referents for an archetype, thereby objectivizing it and removing
it from the sphere of authentic existence.

Heidegger calls language

"der Gllter Geflbrlicbstes" for precisely the same reason. 6
With these assumptions in mind, it now becomes our privilege to
formulate concisely the view of language which has issued from our
consideration of Bultmann's theology.

Por Bultmann, language is

the "momentous" process of providing the symbolic archetypes with .

authentic referents.

We shall discuss this statement in some detail,

and then turn our attention upon language in the operation of a sermon.
Our definition has suggested that language is a "momentous"
process.

It is momentous because language cannot be uttered by a

thinking subject.

Por Bultmann, language arises out of the momentary

decisions of concrete existence, in the relations one has with other
persons.

Por if language is an act of authentic existence, it must

arise in the moment. At the same time, language is a process, or
better still, an "act." It appears to be an act patterned after the
act of God manifest in the kerygma.

Just as the act of Q>d has pro-

vided, within the keryl!!,, authentic referents for the archetypal

existeatiale *'self-understanding," so also language is an act involv-

ing archetypes ard refe~ents. Language appears to take on the characteristics of terzpa whenever it is authentic language.
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'lbe "symbolic archetypes" mentioned in our definition are those

which have been provided by existential analysis.

'lbese archetypes

are symbolic representatives of the existentiali-a .

They are man's

method of symbolizing existence and being.

The symbolic archetypes

furnished by analysis are either neutral in regards to existence; or
they are modified by unauthentic referents (and thus unauthentic
themselves); or they are modified by some, but not enough, authentic
referents (for the kerygma alone, and not existential analysis, can
provide all the necessary authentic referents).

we must now consider

what is meant by "authentic" and "unauthentic" archetypes in greater
detail.
Authentic archetypes are those symbolized existentialia imich
have enough .. authentic referents, even without the kerygma, to bave
an air of authenticity, of being-witbin-e.x istence, about them.

We recall Bultmann's admission that existential analysis is able to
grasp the possibility of true authenticity even apart from the kerypa.
Disregarding for the moment a consideration of the authentic referents
which Bultmann would admit outside of the t.erre (such as might be
found in authentic, though somewhat incomplete, existentialism), let
us consider the authentic referents of the ker;rpa as they modify or
validate the archetype "authentic existence." 'ftlese authentic referents of such an authentic archetype fall into t'WO categories divisible
only for analysis, and not in existence itself.
type, there will automatically be the other.

Where there is one

While in essence (or

shall we say existence?) there is only one type of authentic referent,
namely any human,_personal, concrete decision (made through God's
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gracious action) by which a man decides for the future in the present
while forgetting the past, in our analysis of this authentic referent
we can differentiate and find two categories: (1) An authentic refer-

ent is an act of God authenticating the archetype "self-understanding''
(here referring to the Cross);

(2) an

authentic referent is any other

personal, momentous, decisive act whereby man is able to forget his
past and decide for the future in freedom.

Authentic ar:cbet.ypes, however, can become_ mutilated.

"Unauthentic"

archetypes are those which have been mutated from authentic by the
attachment of unauthentic referents.

Por example, we recall Bultmann's

reference to the archetype ''being" or "Cbd•" Jlor those who think that
there is such a thing as natural revelation apart from the terygma,

this archetype is actually aa unauthentic archetype in that it does
not convey any meaning for the understanding of existence and Being
Itself.

Thus, "God" objectivized has been transformed into an unauthen-

tic archetype, although it is still an archetyoe of sorts.

Such an

unauthentic archetype can be re-transformed into an authentic archetype through the proper attachment of authentic referents, that is,

1be unauthentic referents which transform authentic into unauthen-

tic archetypes are closely related to the objectivizing process which
Bultmann depricates so vehemently.

Por it appears that unauthentic

referents are formulations of the rational mind which attempt to give
meaning to the archetypes of man•s existence by postulating objective
referents connected only logically to these archetypes (that is, by
a superficial division into subject-object), thereby assuming to give

so
meaning to those archetypes even when no self-understanding bas
resulted.

Unauthentic referents:· are modifiers which amplify the

existential archetypes as if they were part of the objective worlcl
around man rather than constitutive of man.

Unauthentic referents

treat man as an object; they deal with the existentialla as if they
were part of the logical, natural, closed world of science.

As

a

result, the symbolic archetypes of such existentialia are mutated
into unauthentic archetypes by the process of receiving unauthentic
referents as attributes.
As

a final consideratioa in our formulation of Bultmann's view

of language, we give thought to the place of the kerygma.

Is the

kerte! merely an example? Is the kerygma the only expression of true
and meaningful ~•nguage as this view of language has emerged from his

theoiogy? We have seen that the kerypa has proved itself a clear
manifestation of Bultmann's view of language.

Now it remains for us

to determine if the kerye is the only such theologically meaning-

ful language.

Insofar as some factors of existential analysis contri-

bute to the self-understanding and authentic existence of man, there
is truly ''meaningful" language apart from. the terygma. On the other
hand, Bultmann carefully postulates that only through tbe kerYP!,
that is thmugh proclamation (which is really God's act), is man

enabled to reach the pure self-realization and self-understanding
which may be called complete "authentic existence." In this sense,
then, it would not be presumptuous to arpe · tbat .·for Bultmann only
the keriea, only the act of proclamation, is _authentic and meaaiilgf ul language, theological language in the

1110s t

precise sense.

Por
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the teryea:. entails the unmasking of the unauthentic referents of
distorted archetypes just as it entails the ascription of authentic
referents to these same archetypes.
God carrying out this process.

Proclamation is the very act of

In sm, Bultmann's definition of the

kerypa is sufficiently encompassing to include all of the language
which is uttered in authentic self-understanding.

Without reserva-

tion we can assert that for Bultmann the kerzpa is the most excellent
example, and the only instance, of authentic language.

Such an

assertion is tempered by Bultmann's escbatological outlook in which
every proclamation of the WOrd of God is at one and the same time
the past, the present, and the future rolled up into one Word.

While one could not expect ever,··aspect of Bultmann's view of
language to be demonstrable from a single literary piece, we might
well expect one of bl• sermons. to exemplify at least the major components of this view.

We tum now to a sermon preached May 30, 1943,

with John 16:22-33 as the text.
and Be:zo~.7

The sermon is recorded in 1bis \forld

Appendix A of this paper contains an annotated outline

of the sermon.

In tbe following summary, we shall select specifics

from that sermon which demonstrate Bultmann's view of language as

it has been outlined above.

we shall make reference to the specific

archetypes therein contained; to the referents, both authentic and
unauthentic; and to the overall process of thought which Bultmann
follows as it sheds light on his view of language.
Bultmann's concern in the sermon is communication with God
through prayer.

lhe existentiale form in question.is existence,
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the possibility of relation to being. Bxistence com.es only through
self-understanding in the concrete, or, in the words of the sermon,
-only when "all oppressive problems are solved and there is only pure
joy." Bultmann is prepared to provide authentic referents for this
symbolic archetype, "&elf-understanding," or pure joy.

He does so

by replacing the unauthentic referents "threatened by the wrld,''
"temporal," "has objects" (whose archetype is actually an unauthentic
one of supposed joy, created by objectivizing self-understalding
into essence within the world), with authentic referents.

Self-

understanding within the concrete situation sees beyond itself (~lies
beyond the world"), has no fear of extinction ("no threat of removal"),

does ·n ot objectivize anything, reaches a point of self-realization
and self-explanation, and creates itself through freedom.
Bultmann has progressed to the point of discussing freedom as
it relates to self-understanding.

The archetype symbolized by the

word "freedom" is undoubtedly "the decision for existence in the
moment." While it is not necessary to enumerate all the authentic
referents here (see Appendix), or the unauthentic referents as they are
displaced (which unauthentic referents have unauthentic ·" anxiety"
as an archetype), one shuuld note especially the first authentic
referent, "freedom from ourselves." 'nlis referent connects its
archetype to the one above, "self-understanding." In addition, one
should note the last referent of the section, the fact that such
freedom ••comes only from being alone in the presence of God." 'lhis
referent, in turn, becomes the new archetype.

While in existential

analysis this new archetype symbolizes death, Bultmann has ascribed
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the function of the death-archetype, together with anxiety, to the
archetype of proclamation, or encounter with God, or terrea. 8
So now we are concerned with referents which provide the authentic

verification for the archetyDe 11enco11t1ter," or proclamation.

Pirst

we note that the unauthentic referents include "clinging to something,"

"covered by rags," "trying to hide." These referents provide unauthentic modification of the unauthentic archetype "G6d" when this archetype
synbolizes the God wbo bas been separated from existent man through
objective, rational processes.

'lbe most decisive authentic referent

for this archetype, "encounter," is Bultmann's satement, "possible
only through the cross." One of the authentic referents, "understanding ourselves," seems to be almost tautologous with the archetype
it modifies.

lbe two referents "confronted by God alone" and

"understanding ourselves" are actually one.
the kerrea.

Here Bultmann reaches

God 1 s act of attributing referents is at the same t!me

both an act of linguistic process (hence called ''proclamation")
and also God's performing what is spoken in the proclamation: encountering man to bring him total self-understanding.
is sui generis.

Hence, the ker>'B!!!

It can be called God's "act" on two accounts:

Q>d acts in man's realm to attribute to man•s self-understanding those
referents Which are fitting; God acts in His own realm to accomplish
the archetype in the very process of attributing authentic referents
to it (that is, by confronting man). These two are always inseparable.
It is equally interesting to note how Bultmann sweeps away the unauthentic
referents of the archetype ''encounter."

'Die unauthentic referents he

attributes to the unauthentic archetype "anxiety," which, if
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authenticated, will incorporate the judgmental aspect of the kerygma.
'lbe final referent of consequence for the archetype "encounter" is
"proved in the openness to enco·unters of life."

'Dlis ls the arche-

type "concrete moment." Actual ·proclamation can occur only in
openness to encounters of life, in the moment.

We note that the

authentic referents attributed to this archetype are, at least
formally, tautologous with it.

However, they are more than tautolo-

gies; they are authentic referents enlightening the self-uaderstandi~
in the moment by attributing to the moment characteristics descriptive
of authentic existence.
Bultmann has run his course in this sermon.

He began by saying

that true existence (prayer, relation to being),is possible only when
all oppressive problems are solved• When there is complete
self-understanding in the concrete.

He proceeded to proclaim

that such self-understanding is possible only by freedom, by decision
for existence; this decision comes from being in the presence of God
(through the kerygma) in the cross.

Such cross-confrontation arises

in the openness to encounters of life.

Once again we are back at

the theme of self-understanding in the concrete.
In this sermon Bultmann bas demonstrated theological language

in use.

Prom within his own authentic existence we have followed

him-in the concrete moment of the sermon-attributi·ng authentic
referents to archetypes, thereby displacing the unauthentic referents.
His sermon is nothing more nor less than the process of attributing
authentic referents to the basic archetype "self-understaming."
His sermon is pure kerygma.

It is an act of God, Just as it is God

ss
acting immediately upon the hearers.

God unites the authentic

referents and the archetype; only He can do that.

Wilen one proclaills

the kerypa, God deigns to accomplish His action through that person.
Just as Bultmann bas been involved in proclamation of the kerygma,
in putting into linguistic expression the Word of everlasting being,
be has been engaged in the ''momentous" process of providing the
symbolic archetypes of existence with authentic referents, concurrent-

ly displacing unauthentic referents and unauthentic archetypes.
sermon is kerypa.

The

As kerypa, it exemplifies, demonstrates, and

incorporates all of the meaningful language that can be spoken by
man "about" God.
In this chapter we have concerned ourselves with formulating
precisely the view of language which is Bultmann's.

We have enmnerated

those basic presuppositions which issue from his theology and affect

his view of language.

We have characterized his view of language as

the "momentous" process of providing the symbolic archetypes (of
existence) with authentic referents.

We have exemplified this view

of language with reference to one of his senaons.

In an attempt to

remain as objective as possible, we have withheld any evaluation until
the final chapter.

There we shall have the opportunity to evaluate,

appreciatively and critically, Bultmann's view of langunge and the
theology from which it stems.

CHAP'DDl IV
APPRBCIATION AND CRITIQUB OP 'DIBOI.OGY AND VIBW OP LANGUAGB

'lheology and View of Language Investigated from Within and Without
It is now our privilege to express appreciation of the work of
Rudolf Bultmann in theology and language, and .t o analyze critically
his system of thought and its emergent language-view both from within

and from without.

Since it has been demonstrated above that Bultmann's

view of language issues unmistakenly from his theology, we cannot
concern ourselves only with bis view of language.

On the other hand,

neither can our concern rest only with his theology.

In this chapter

we shall approve those aspects of his theology and language-view Which

are valuable, and bring to light those aspects of both theology and
language which appear to be untenable.

After acknowledging the valu-

able factors, we shall turn our attention to difficulties encountered
within the system itself.

'lben we shall question the system from

without.
.

Christians find little difficulty in appreciating Bultmann's
emphasis upon preaching the Word of God.

In this day and age, with

words tumbling upon men in a continuous barrage, it is necessary for
the Word to enter men's bearing.

'lhe impo~tance of preaching is

assumed in Bultmann's theology and language-view as well, and he has
made a valuable contribution in emphasizing the importance of preach-·
ing.

Scripture bas not hesitated to speak of the Christ as God's last

Word to men.1 'lbroughout the Old Testament too we find a constan~
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emphasis upon the piercing Word as it comes into men's hearts through
their ears.

Por preaching has alwaya been an essential part of the

Church's mission.

St. Paul refuses to separate the reconciliation

of airist from the minister who preaches that reconciliation. 2 'lbe
Lutheran Confessions unhesitatingly make preaching of the Gospel one
of the marks of the Church:
Ba wird auch gelehret, dass alle Zeit musse ein heilige

christliche ICirche sein und bleiben, -welche ist die Versammlung aller Glaubigen, bei welchen das Bvangelium rein gepredigt und die heiligen Sakrament lauts des Bvangelii
gereicht werden.3
'11lere is little doubt in the minds of evangelical catholic Christians
that preaching is no less important in the modern world than it has
been in the past ages of the Church.
Bultmann also suggests correctly that preaching ls to be done
with meaning.

That is the preacher's task week after week. Merely

to repeat 1101.'ds is not to give accurate denotation to them. One wald
never preach a German serman to an Baglish congregation. In like
manner, the task of preaching to modern man is difficult; Bultmann
has alerted the Church to the problem of preaching with meaning, and
attempted to deal with it as ~11.

We must credit him with endeawr-

ing to reach man where he is today with a message much too deep for
bis activiatic life.

Bultmann, as a chaplain, confronted troops in

the trenches of the first World Wari preachers confront men in the
pews of modern churches week after week.
the same: to preach with meaning.

To

But their task is one and

preach with meaning, at least

two req~irements must be filled: the preacher must understand the
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message to be preached in all of its ramifications; in addition,

the preacher must be well enough acquainted with the hearer's world

to relate the message to it.

Bultmann has attempted to meet both

of these qualifications.
Preaching with meaning entails confronting the hearer with the

person of Jesus Qirist-.

In this respect Sul tmann is to be commended

for emphasizing the importance of the personal encounter of faith.
Cahill notes that Bultmann's stress on intersubjectivity "makes clear
that there are areas of religious truth which are grasped and understood only through personal living, personal conviction, the entire
moral and intellectual being of the subject."4

In a similar spirit,

the Lutheran Confessions are not slow to condemn the suggestion that
the objective knowledge of facts comprises the totality of faith:
Bs geschicht auch Unterricbt, dass man hie nicht von solchen
Glauben redet, den •uch die Teufel und Gottlosen haben, die
auch ~ie Historien glauben, dass Christus gelitten hab und
auferstanden sei von Toten, sander man redet von wah~em Glauben,
der da glaubet, dass wir durch Christum Goad und Vergebung der
Sunde erlangen. Und der nu wiss, dass er ein gilldigen Gott
durcb Christ1.1111 hat, kennet also Gott, rufet ihn an und ist
nicht oho Gott wie die Heiden. Dann Teufel und Gottlosen
glauben diesen Artikel, Vergebung der Sunde, nicht; darum
seind sie Gott feind, konnen ihne nicht anrufen, nichts Guts
von ihme hoffen. 5
We can appreciate Bultmann's concern for confrontation as part of
the task of meaningful preaching.

Just as it is the task of the modern

preacher to make his speech meaningful to men, so it is his task to
answer the request of bis hearers when they plead, "We -,uld see Jesus."

1bere are otber aspects of Bultmann's thought which are wrthy
of commendation, but we proceed with an analysis of his thought critically evaluated at once.

While later ,fe shall examine his position
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over and against other theologies, we first take him to task within
his own frame of thought.

Having understood bis theology and his

language-view as best we can, we are now in a position to ask him
questions from within bis own frame of reference.

While it will not

always be possible to evaluate completely the ramifications which
adjustments in bis theology effect upon his language-view, it is to
be underst·ood that we approach bis theology from a critical angle
solely to demonstrate the weaknesses in the view of language which
has emerged fr0111 it.
1be first difficulty within the system of thought is ·that
Bultmann's presuppositions are unsupr,orted.

Some might assert that

presuppositions are assumptions, and they need not be examined.
Others might argue that examining the presuppositions of a system
is a simultaneous·comparison of one system to another.

On the other

hand, presuppositions within a system dare never go unexamined~ even
within the system they serve.

It is part of critical thinking to

examine one's presuppositions from within the structure built upon
them in order to determine (1) whether the system follows conclusively
from the assumptions; (2) whether all of the stated assumptions are

necessary; (3) whether any assumptions are contradictory; (4) whether
there are other ass1.111ptions which have emerged unnoticed, and have
not been recognized as prior assumptions.
'lhere is one basic assumption which runs throughout Bultmann's
thought, but is neither expressed nor defended as such.

Bultmann does

not demonstrate ~by man ought to strive to become an authentic being
in the first place.

That is a not to be asked.

Nevertheless, it is
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this basic assumption·whicb underlies the whole of his thought,
even though it is unexpressed.

Since Bultmann refuses either to

recognize it as an assumption, or to defend it as such (to do so
would take him squarely into the forbidden realm of metaphysics),
his entire system immediately assumes the air of persuasion as we
shall note later.
A second difficulty encountered in consideration of the assumptions is the rather imprecise formulation o"f the assumption dealing
with modern man and the modern world.

It is true that Bultmann's

concept of revelation suits the modern personalistic, subjective
climate. 6 And yet, the charge has been leveled, and not without
validity, that,:BuJ.tmann•s assumptions about the modern scientific
world are imprecise and dated. Nalevez agrees with Jaspers when
Jaspers complains,
Bverytbing suggests that, like most of the rest of us, be
(Bultmann) either ignores or does not understand its (science's)
fundamental statements. If there is something of which·we can
be quite certain, for us all, it is this, that in the form
which it has assumed during recent decades, science has given
up the attempt to make any picture of the world at all, because
it knows that such a picture cannot possibly be created.?
Macquarrie becomes more specific when he charges Bultmann with speaking about the 1110dern world picture (the totality of what we have
learned from science) when he means to speak of tbe average
self-understanding of modern man (which is· not scientific, is
secular, and takes man as the ultimate).

In the same account,

Macquarrie recalls an occasion when he reminded Bultmann of the
fact that thousands of people go to Lourdes every year, and there
seemed to be nothing inacceptable in this practice to many modern
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minds.

Bultmann's six wrds in reply spoke a volume: "But these

are not modern men."8 Macquarrie goes on to suggest that Bultmann
has made concessions to the modern man's self-understanding, mt
always to the benefit of the kerypa; such concessions arose in bis
confusion of the conception of modernity:
Butlmann's own position is needlessly ambiguous. In some
passages he makes concessions to the modern secularized
self-understanding as well as to the modern world-picture.
His position would have been greatly strengthened if he had
shown less deference to modernity and criticized its assumptions more thoroughly. The concessions which he makes do not
represent (p. 240) his own typical 'View, which bolds firmly
to the kerypa, but arises from the confusions in his conception of modernity.9
If the above statements are true, then Bultmann has failed to
be

Sp!

cif ic in his assuaption dealing with modern man. At one time

be refers to the 1110dern M>rld as it is described by science.10 At
other times be has in mind the closed tbought-'10rld of modern selfunclerstanding, which will allow for no:.such an idea as a transcending
power interfering with life. 11 These two pictures of modernity are

quite different, and are not to be lllixed together with verbal manipulation.

If his assumption about the modern world deals specifically with

the scientific outlook prevalent in it, then he should be willing to
admit with the scientists (as Jaspers sa,s) that science has give up

any attempt to picture the wrld.

On the other hand, if his assump-

tion about the incomprehensibility of the New Testament world to modern
man is based upon a consideration of 1110dern man's self-umerstaming,
then he should be more explicit about the makeup of this self understanding. and less anxious to condemn the myths of the New Testa-

ment as wholly unintelligible to modern man.

Prom this brief
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consideration it is apparent that Bultmann has homework to do in
describing modernity.

'111is basic assumption is beclouded with all

manner of- side issues, and seems to be more a "catch-all" than a
precise formulation of. "prior understanding. 11
'lbe second major difficulty within the system does not deal
specifically with presuppositl. ons, but with the system as developed

upon the presuppositions. The difficulty lies in Bultmann's insistence
that only the terypa can perform the act of self-realization for man,
bestowing the grace to forget the past and face the possible future.

Is the tervpa really necessary? Is it not tbe last remnant of the
myth that Bultmann has set out to eliminate? While Bultmann has argued
that the mythical view of the world must be accepted or rejected in
its entirety,12 his usage of the word "demythologizing" points to the
fact that he considers the primary language of religion to be myth.13

It is not difficult to demonstrate that the kerypa fits into one of
the definitions of myth which Bultmann has given.

Is it necessary,

then, to retain the kerypa? Bultmann has removed the actual significance of Christ, and made His birth, death, and resurrection but a
symbol within us.
That a person was born, crucified, arose, if affirmed at all
(and it certainly cannot be affirmed in the case of the resurrection), is affirmed only incidentally and as a possibility
or ~robabilitI~ certainly not as a constitutive element of
saving event.
The question arises, if Christ is but a symbol (symbols are interchangeable and not exclusive), how could He be unique115

Bultmann

answers this charge by saying that this is exactly the scandal of
the act·ion of God perceived only by faith, where the foundation and
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object of faith are one.
destructive a charge.

This is an insufficient answer to so

Ogden has followed Bultmann's course through

to the finish, and he demonstrates the truthfulness of the charge.
He finds no room for the Bultmannian act of God.16
Any system of theology which :ls as deeply indebted to philosophy

as Bultmann's is to Heidegger's does indeed filld it difficult to
sever itself from that system.

Given the Heideggerian Dasein, it

does not seem necessary to import the kerzea unless one has a prior
disposition towards it and must make room for it.

Por Bultmann has

allowed that existential analysis is able to apprehend the existentiale
"authentic existence" (and its symbolic archetype as well), but not
attain it.

Prom another point of view, he has empowered Dasein even

to achieve authentic existence by the method in which he has ripped
the ker;ypa from its historical foundation.

Jac1111es Cuttat wastes

no words when he argues that Bultmann's reduction of Christ's historicity-to a mere occasion for self-understanding is actually a mythical
inner movement towards Christ,
transforming into terms which are outwardly Christian a spiritual
attitude which is ••• Hindu ••• He reduces the Christian message
to a mere verbal and historical symbol, to a mirror which
reflects rather than opens the way for our salvation. In other
words, it is all a Christianized myth.17
It is apparent that Bultmann's insistence upon the kerygma as tbe
only gracious means to self-understanding and self-realization is an

.

insistence born of cbgmatic compulsion, and not an attitude resulting
from the fact that the kerypa is an integral unity in his existential
analysis and theology.

Since the kerygma is a loosely connected

"Christianized myth," it too is vulnerable to the knife of demytbology.
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Another difficulty within Bultmann's system is his unwillingness
to carry on an exhaustive process of argumentation.

At times

Bultmann is unwilling to pursue inimical arguments which could
prove to be just as valid as those Which he takes to be bis own, ·
though both co~ from tbe same initial stem.

The sullen, almost mono-

.

tonous rigidity of his language may be a symptom of such an unwillingness to examine other arguments as possible avenues for thought.

Speat-

i -ng of Bultmann's style of language, Jaspers says,
shrouds the splendours of the Bible with an enveloping layer
of dry, objedtive language. His style is neither ponderous
nor light, but conveys an atmosphere of sullen rigidity.18

He

lbis style of prose demonstrates Bultmann's tendency to reject any
argument not in consort with his own thought.

His constant plea

that he "does not understand•• may indicate something more than a
difficulty in grasping symbols; it may indicate an unWillingness.
Hepburn bas isolated specific cases in which Bultmann has proved himself unwilling to admit evidence that would be detrimental or disastrous
to his position, even though such evidence proceeds

fE0111

a line of argu-

ment which Bultmann himself at one time or another proposes to follow:
1. The antinomies in the New Testament are construed so as to

allow him to conclude, "Rise, therefore, above the mythological." Other conclusions are possible.
2. Bultmann says that removal of Christianity from the sphere
of myth upgrades it in value. Re goes on to argue that
~emoval from the realm of proof must also raise it in value.
But he has failed to argue for a valid proposition inimical
to his position, namely, that the absence of evidence does
not disqualify a religion from being acceptable by reasoned men.
3. Absence of proof is commended by Bultmann; he argues that if
faith were provable, it l«>uld reduce God to the status of one
item among others in the -f urniture of the universe, "aid only in
that realm (are we) justified in demancli ng proof." This latter
sentence begs the question. It assumes that we already know
there are two realms; this tenet should surely appear as part of
the end product, not the initial presupposition of a theology.

-
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Hepburn, an Bnglish empiricist, concludes with the suggestion that
Bultmann's failure to admit evidence detrimental to his position, or
even to examine such evidence willingly, is made more glaring by the
fact that he will not support this as a crucial tenet, even though it
is sucb. 19
Another charge which bas been leveled against the system of
Bultma·nn deals specifically with the character of language which he
employs.

In our consideration of his view of language, we concluded

that all theological language is for Bultmann kerypatic.

As such,

it has as its function the summonsing of man to authentic existence.

All true theological language will have about it the air of persuasion.
It is specifically this persuasive tenor.which proves to be a thorn
for some critics.

Bultmann bas been·. classed with the existentialist

thinkers, and he falls under the same linguistic criticism they do.
The persuasive air of their language derives from the usage of metaphor and suggestion.

While logical empiricists are charged with

being content "to elaborate the subtleties of formal analysis ••• the
existentialists, determined to grapple with the real problems, find
no formal analysis that is adequate to the task.

'Ibey are constrained

to quit the beaten track, to wallow in metaphor and suggestion." 20
There is no room for "neutral" language either in existentialism or
in Bultmann's theology.

Perre' charges existentialists and existential

theology with intentionally loading terms with evaluative assumptions:
••1 hold, in brief• that many of the key utterances of existentialism may

be recognized ••• as covert evaluation depending upon persuasive defini-

tions of crucial terms. 1121

With persuasive definitions, the thinkers
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set out to alter the name which is ordinarily used.

Bxistence now

can be either "authentic" or "unauthentic." Such a procedure makes
the whole of Bultmann's language persuasive in tenor, and prohibits
a concise evaluation of his language as language.

Zuurdeeg's sugges-

tion that logical positivism will help the language of theology, as
a language of conviction, by setting it off from the language of fact
is perhaps a valuable suggestion.22 And yet, the problem of relating
the language of convictional theology to the language of fact remains;
when theologians like Bultmann refuse to speak a language
. of theology
which is meaningful to those who understand only the language of fact,
the cause of the Gospel bas not &een advanced. A complete reliance
upon persuasive language will in the end be viewed as the utterance of
a spirit divorced from the aodern world, closed to the truths which
the language of fact has to offer.

Por persuasive language has the

inherent possibility ofarerwhelming and overtaking the very truths
about which it is persuaded.

Tillich argues that religious symbols

can never be viewed solely as symbols of persuasion, lest they become
idols displacing the God

who■

they were to serve:

Religious symbols point symbolically to that which transcends
all of them. But since, as symbols, they participate in that
to which they point, they always have the tendency (in the
human mild, of course) to replace that to which they are supposed to point, and to become ultimate in themselves. And in the
moment in which they do this, they become idols.a3
It is in this situation that theological language which is persuasive

is apt to find itself.

Such a situation presents a difficulty for

Bultmann, a difficulty not easily overcome when one considers that
his language-view is so intimately related to his theology.
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The final factor with which we are concerned within BultmaM's
system is his overzealous reference to God's "action," and with it,
his embracing of the analogical method of tbeo•logical language.
As noted earlier in the paper, Bultmann insists that theological

statements must be concerned directly with human life.

He

reminds

us, ~I am interpreting theological affiniations as assertions about
human life. 1124

He is certain that if man speaks of God's action in

tems of physical categories, or compared with natural force-even
if His action. is not supposed to manifest its divine character in
such an event-God's action will be understood in the categories
of essence and will escape man in his existence. 25

'Ibis assumption

of Bultmann's brings with it a host of difficulties, not the least of
which is a complete reljance upon the process of anaiogy in all
theological language.

All statements about God are analogical state-

men1S based on man-to-man relations.

Bultmann unasbamedly aff i.rms

the same when he says, "Such happenings between man and man are a
pattern of what happens between Q>d and man.

But what happens

between man and man never embraces the whole of our existence."26
Already the difficulty appears.

Analogical statements made about

God will be based entirely on what happens between man and man, even
though such happenings ''never embrace(s) the whole of our existence.••

Qirist's birth, death, and resurrection can be referred to only insofar
as they are analogous to acts of man in some way or another.

By this assumption, B1:1ltaann is forced to speak of God in terms
of man.

That aspect of man which is most "real" or existential for

him is man's decisive action, action in the present.

So, be is content
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to speak of "God's act"; that is all that he is allowed, by analogy
with relations between men, to say about God.

All that the New

Testament says, am all that faith knows, is the act of God through
which man becomes capable of self-coanitment, capable of love and
faith, and capable of authentic life. 27

'lbis aspect of Bultmann's

theology. is so important that we shall quote at length his discussion
of language as it deals with tbe act of God.

We notice especially

his suggestion that to refer to God otherwise is to speak about an
idea of God, but not about God Himself:

•

When we speak of God as acting, we mean that we are confronted
with :God, addressed, asked, judged, or blessed by God. Therefore, to speak in this manner is not to speak in symbols or
images, but to speak analogically. Por When we speak in this
manner of God as acting, we conceive God's action as an analogue
to the actions taking place between men. Moreover, we conceive
the communion between God and man as an analogue to the communion
between man and man. It is in this analogical sense that we
speak of God's love and (p. 69) care for men, of His demands and
of Hls wrath, of His promise am grace, and it is in this analogical sense that we call Him Pather. We are not only justifi~d
in speaking thus, but we must do so, since now we are not
spe~king of an idea about God, but of God Himself. Thus, God's
love and care, etc., are not images or symbols; these concep..
tions mean real experience of God as acting here and aow ••• .
As applied to God the physical import of the term father has
disappeared completely; it expresses a purely personal relationship. It is in this analogical sense that we speak of God as
Pather. 28
Bultmann's use of analogical statements about the "act" of God
is a kind of demythologizing in the sense that the nafve relation
to the symbol which characterizes myth is replaced by a conscious
awareness that symbol is symbol.

"a transcendent

God

Bultmann has chosen to speak about

present and active in history, 1129 at¥1 to talk

about such a transcen1ent God ·" even if it is expressed la language
drawn from human existence, carries a reference which points to a

:,
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reality beyond the confines of any existential analysis. 1130

Bultmann has resorted to speaking of acts of God in the place of
Mythical statements because of his overriding interest in existential analysis.

Nevertheless, his dealing with a "transcendent

God" indicates that soMe symbolism will need to be employed, even

if it is analogous symbolism.
Bultmann'is torn between his intention to posit every theological statement in terms of human existence, and the knowledge that
the same is impossible when speaking of a transcendent God.

He says

th~t if language about God "is to have any real meaning at all, it
must denote an act in a real, objective sense, and not just a symbolical or pictorial expression.•31 But he quietly adds a corrective:
On the other hand, if the action of God is not to·:be : conceived
as a .,rldly phenomenon capable of being apprehended apart
from its existential reference, it can only be spoken of by
speaking simultaneously of myself as the person who is existentially concerned.32
'lbe gap can be bridged:-by-.- speating of God in terms of the acts of
man.

Por language that talks about the act of God "is ••• neither

symbolical nor pictorial, though it is certainly analogical, for it
assumes an analogy between the activity of God aid that of man, and
between the fellowship of GDd and man and that of man with man."33
While Bultmann's intention in the process of demythologizing was
to translate all mythical statements into existential statements, he
has been forced to leave room for analogical statements as well.

Por

there is a great difference in a statement about human existence, and
a statement in terms of human existence which is supposed to refer
analogously to God (as in bis talk of an "act of God"). Macquarrie
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reminds Bultmann,
Bither we must say that here there is a limit to demythologizing,
or else we must redefine the aim of demythologizing, and say
that it intends to translate myth into existential statements
plus analogical statements or into consciously symbolic statements, in which the immediacy of the myth has been "broken. 1134
Bultmann is insistent in refusing to admit that talk about an "act
of Q>d'' is mythological.

"Anyone who asserts that to speak of an

act of Goel at a11·ts mythological language is bound to regard the
idea of an act of God in Christ as a myth." 35 In refusing to admit
that to speak of God as acting is to speak in mythological terms,

Bultmann argues that God's act is hidden to the -,rld, but revealed
to faith and hence not mythological.

God's action is not an· act

which happens between worldly events, but it is to be construed
as happening within thea ••• Only so-called natural, secular
(wrldly) events are visible to every man and capable of
proof. It is within them that God's hidden action is taking
place. 36

God's action then is not to be construed mythologically, but analogically.

Por it is analogous to the action which occurs within the sphere

of man's relation to man.
Since Bultmann has accepted the use of analogy as a valid means
of symbolizing the transcendent God, we must examine the linguistic
tool of analogy to determine if Bult•nn can speak analogically aid
concurrently refuse to be concerned with God's essence apart from a
confrontation with man.

We shall use an analysis of the process of

analogy made by Prederick Perrt! in Language, Logic, and God.

Perrcf

differentiates between t\10 types of analogy, the analogy of attribution and the analogy of proport!olUility. 37 In analogy of attribution,
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the prime analogate possesses the characteristic in question in a
wholly proper (univocal) and actual sense, while the other analogate
has predicated of it a "like" characteristic in a relative or derivative sense.

In order for this analogy to function properly, there- ·

must be some prior relation between the two analogates by which the
common attribution is made possible.

Usually in theological language,

Q>d is the creative cause of the finite analogate, and -b is causal
creativity serves as the prior relation.

In sum,

the characteristic

in question can be attributed to the secord analogate in a derived
sense, based on a prior real relation.

The problem with analogy

of attribution, according to Perre\ is that it is far too permissive;
based on the prior relation, anything may be said of the second
analogate in a "derived" sense even though it may not be the case.
At first glance, Bultmann's use of the analogy of "act" (action)
does not appear to be an analogy of attribution.

If it is an analogy

of attribution, that is, if statements about God's action are made

in a derived sense from the univocal sense of man's action, then a
prior relation between God and man is necessary.

In an ordinary

analogy of attribution within theology, this relation is one of a
causal nature; this cannot be the case in Bultmann's analogy.

If

''being" is assumed by Bultmann to be the prior relation (although
this is im1>0ssible, for man has no truly authentic being apart from
God, ard hence no analogis entis), then we would be permitted to say

that God's act was like (in a derived sense) man's.
still have no knowledge of the formal
analogate "Goel."

But we would

or proper character of

the

We are left with a "virtual'' similarity between
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Q,d's am man's actions.

too permissive.

In addition, this type of analogy is far

It 1110uld allow too many predicates to be applied

analogously to God in a derived sense, or at least more than action
alone.
It appears that Bultmann's reference to God's action as analogous
to man's is an analogy of proportionality, the second type of analogy
.

exami-ned by Perre'.

In the analogy of proportionality, only one of the

two analogates deserves to have·predicated of it the common analogue

in a formal sense.

Both of the analogates can have the analogue

attributed in the literal or umnetaphorical sense, but each possesses
the analogue proportionately to the nature of the analogate concerned
(e.g. ''blue" eyes and "blue" sky).

Perre suggests tbat the problem

with this type of analogy is that each of the analogates stipulates
in which way it agrees with the formal sense of the analogue.

In

doing so, we.move an-even greater distance from the desired equality
of the analogy. A more serious objection is that there are actually
two unknowns, not one.

Por although we may have a rather precise

characterization of one unkno,m (e.g. "love" in man if we are ·making
an analogical statement about God's love), we must try to understand

God's nature by postulating another entirely different unknown; hence
we are even farther from the analogy than when we_began.

If it is true that Bultmann's analogy of God's action is an
analogy of proportionality, then it is equally true that Bultmann
does not protect himself from the necessity of practicing "essential"
theology, try as be may.
God

Por Bultmann, man acts in the formal sense,

and man both in the literal or unmetapborical sense.

It is the
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task of existential analysis to describe what the "act" of man
entails, and Bultmann is able to define what an action of man is.
One "unknown" is cared for.

But the other remains.

'lb define what

''action" for God1-·means, it will be necessary to postulate another
"unknown" of

God

by which we are able to delineate in what way God's

action agrees with the formal sense of the analogue "action" of man.
Por Bultmann, this is impossible.

Re

refuses to speak of any aspect

of God's nature apart from the "act" of God; and yet, in an analogy
of proportionality. it is necessary to postulate such "givens" of
the second analogate in order that the analogue may be delimited
precisely.

If Bultmann wishes to speak of God's action as analogous

to man's, then he is forced by the logic of analogy to proceed to a
full theology at once.

Bultmann is prepared to utilize the process

of analogy, but be is unprepared to abide by the laws of its usage.
To

the degree that his use of analogy fa lla short of the logic of

analogy, it is no less mythological than the New Testament texts

which he has attempted to demythologize.
Passing beyond _Bultmann's rather haphazard handling of the tool
of analogy, we must turn an eye to his analogical statement as it
stands.

It is to be questioned if Bultmann's analogy of the God who

"acts" does not carry with it an inherent metaphysic. · We take
John Macmurray seriously when he suggests that if action is strippe~
of its intentional character, then it is·a mere process of events;
if, on the other hand, it retains this intentional character, it .is:
more than a mere process of events. 38 If Bultmann's God who "acts"
acts without intention, then a mere process of events results.
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If, on the other band, Bultmann's God who "acts" acts intentionally,
then Bultmann is committed to a full metaphysical explanation of the
intention which God has; he is committed to a metaphysic of GDd.
Bultmann may assert that the analogy is from man to God.

If this is

the case, then either man must be credited with all of the "intentional"
and directional aspects of action (both God's and man's), or there
must be a complete absence of "intention" in the action of both God
and man.
A final disturbing aspect of Bultmann's use of analogy is his
insistence that all analogy must begin with man, and proceed from there
to God.

Bven the kerypa is put in terms of God's act as it mirrors

the action of man.

'lbe Scripture is not so anxious to admit that

all analogy finds its source in man's action.

'lbe Scripture asserts
•

tbat some human speech about God firds its origin in qualities of
God which have been taken over into human language by the process of
analogy from Goel to man. A strong case can be -made for the suggestion
that a man's love for his wife should be analogous to Qirist•s low
for the Church, and not the other way arounc1.39

In a similar manner,

the families of the earth are named after the Pather of heaven, not
the other way around. 40 Gal, as Sovereign ling, had named man "adam";
man, sensing an analogous sovereignty over the animals, gave each
of them a name.41 It is possible to see many of man•s actions in the
Old Testament (resting on Sabbath, praying, sacrificing, obeying the
law) as actions performed in imitation of •bis God, 42 analogous from
God

rather than towards Him.

If God is the source of some analogy,

then the use of analogy is properly considerecl to be objectification;
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in that sense; it is not the height of unbelief, but the most sincere
appreciation and worship of that God who bestows even such gifts to
be used in His praise.

We have concluded our investigation of difficulties within

BultmaM'S theological system.

While it is sufficient to realize that

any ctiticism of his theology is inferentially a criticism of his view
of language, we wish to pinpoint more explicitly those areas of bis
language-view affected.

It is evident that Bultmann's failure to

provide clarification for what certainly is a basic assumption (namely
that man ought to strive to become an authentic being in the first
place), and his rather imprecise handling of another assumption de~ling with modernity-both alike affect his view of language at the ground
level.

Por bis view of language will be affected directly by tbe pre-

cision or imprecision with which he handles his assumptions.

Perhaps

his inconclusive view of modernity eliminated a segment of language
that is valuable am valid.

His failure, on the other band, to integrate

the terzgma as an essential element of his system rather than a contiguous accessory will have ruinous effects upon a language-view
which visualizes the terygma as the primary example and sum total of
meaningful language.

His unwillingness to carry on an exhaustive pro-

cess of argumentation manifests the unstable foundation that underlies
his view of language.

His excessive usage of persuasive language demon-

strates the telescopic approach which his limited language-view aakes
its own.

This exclusive use of persuasive language has isolated

Bultmann from the very•world of fact to which he had hoped to address
the kerygma.

Finally, his utilization of the analogy of "act" is
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feeble; his view of language (as well as his theology) must begin
with a discussion of God "in Himself," or else it can make no reference (even analogically) to the transcendent God Who deigns to invade

the universe.
We have reached the point where we can examine Bultmann's theology, as well as his language-view, from the vantage-point of other
theologies and philosophies.
thought bas been

made

While our previous analysis of Bultmann's

from within its own frame of reference, we now

turn to an analysis from without.

The major question is whether or

not the determinative theology (as well as the resultant language-view)
which Bultmann has selected is a complete and proper theology.

We

shall approach this problem by examining the deficiencies of existen-

tial analysis as a theology.

1ben we shall turn to "essential"

theology as a counter-proposal.

Pinally we shall see mat light the

Holy Scriptures cast upon the selection of a determinative theology.
'lbe question at hand is basically this one: Can exis_tential

analysis provide a sufficient base upon which to construct the totality of a theological system? Bxistential analysis begins with the

knower

am

analyzes 'Nbat it is that he knows.

'Die Neo-'lbomists of

our day have called just such a procedure the "subjectivism" of modern
man.· Neo-Thomism ~• Willing to argue that man suffers from the "Cartesian

blight." Iver since Descartes philosophy has begun with epistemology,
with a consideration of how the knower gets to know, and what it is
that he knows.

Neo-Thomistic philosophy asks the appropriate question:

Is this the proper procedural method? Bultmann, too• begins with what
Bonboeffer calls "man come of age." Such a man is atheistic. And
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Bultmann suggests that it is the Church's task to make men once again
aware of God, for men hav~ dispossessed Him.

Bultmann seems to be

suggesting that the Church is to plead with men to let God back into ·
their minds.

'lbe Church must begin with man, and then go to God.

But there is another side to the story.
God

has not been put out;

He

It is possible-probable-that

has abandoned the world, and left it.

He

bas withdrawn, and all that remains is the "empty bench" of Arthur
Miller•s "After the Pall." He -bas left only His wrath.

He

has given

to the Qiurch not the task of pleading with man, starting first with
man's mind as the knowing subject and then proceeding from there.

He

has given the task of proclaialng His transcendence, His wrath, and
His love.
Bxlstential analysis provides no basis for a theology in the
light of the Cartesian blight.

Por existential analysis is dependent

upon its predecessor, phenomenology, aid phenomenology is a vivid
example of the Cartesian blight.

Brown correctly criticises

Bultmann's selection of existential analysis as bis determinative
theology when he says:
Is phenomenology the proper context in which to assess the
ultimate significance (if.one hesitates over the word "11etaphysical11) of such concepts as "love-,•• the "thou" (with its
ethical implication) , and "genuine bistory'•143
Bxistential analysis prohibits any consideration of God in and
of Himself, apart from a confrontation with man.

Such a procedure is

dangerous, for it threatens to eliminate any consideration of the wrathful

God

who bas judged His creatures and found them guilty. Although

there is a remnant of law-judgment in Bultmann's kerypa, his
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insistence upon God as the God-of-confrontation is dangerously close
to Robinson's God as that "segment" of Being which is gracious, and
only that segment. 44 ".Por God to be Q,d, He must be only gracious," ls
the dangerous prior assumption of this argument.
The anthropology which existential analysis provides is an incom.
plete one.

Bultmann ignores any suggestion that there is a substaatival

self. But his constant concern for man in the decisions of life betray
the existence of some sort of "self" beyond the mere empirical.

The

essence of man for Bultmann is bis will, for man becomes what he
chooses

am

desires.

'lberefore, in the terygma, God confronts man's

will, for Be ··-comes with His demanding and saving revelation in a

person-to-person relationship. 45 Bultmann's description of man as
will, and bis refusal to speak of a substantival self,li1R& repercussions

throughout his theology since be bas chosen to speak of God only in
terms of man's existence.
Some have accused Bultmann's

theology with tbe words, "It has

taken away my Lord, and I know not where it bas laid Him.•~

These

words are somewhat sacrilege and overly emotional, and yet they sum
up the poverty of Bultmann's Christian existential analysis. Malevez
has accurately described it as reduced to preaching, with no worship

and no sacrament.

'lbe preaching itself is reduced to this mediocre

theme: you are forgiven sinners in your decisions.

prospects for the future.
act of God.

The

There are no firm

There is no foundation in history for the

knowledge which is offered to man prolongs and

completes a certain ttnatural" knowledge which is immanent in existence
itself. Bultmann believes it is .in the interest of reason to
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demythologize tbe message; how then can he im)lO&e silence when this
same reason asks for the least light on the foundation of belief?46
Bultmann's theology (and resultant language-view) is incomplete
not onlj insofar as it relies upon existential analysis alone; it
also fails to speak of God in any way divorced from man's existence,
in and of Himself. Bultmann has eliminated any "essential" theology
both in his dealings with history and in his consideration of natural
revelation and the Scripture.

Bultmann has no room for historical

facts per se; neither can be speak of a natural revelation of GDd
apart from the kerre••

In both of these areas, the theology of

"essence" to which the Church bas committed its.e lf for centuries is
offered up as a sacrifice to an imprecise picture of modernity.

We

shall now consider the inadequacy of Bultmann's theology as it deals
with history and natural revelation while disregarding any theology
of "essence~"
Bultmann deals with history non-dimensionally.

The threefold

dimension of history-past, present, future-bas been collapsed to
the non-dimensional present realized in the act of proclaiming the

ke~Y.8!!! here and now.47 ·Bultmann can say that the event which takes
place in Christ, when demythologized, has no recognizable objective
(historical) reality. Malevez bas accurately suggested that two
interpretations of this statement may be made: (1) The divine event
has an objective reality, but it is unrecognizable to man as such,
but apprehended by faith (for although God has done something in
Christ apart from us, we cannot see this "something" or "object,"
~r can we prove it)~ (2) The divine event-has done nothing outside
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the believer, for the reality of the divine act consists solely
and wholly in intimate approach to the soul through the preaching
of the Word.48 Malevez proceeds to argue that an objective (historical) interpretation of Bultmann's Christ-event is possible:
Such an interpretation consists in making Bultmann say, in spite
of his desire for radical demythologizing, that in the divine
act of salvation there is a certain objectivity manifested
within history (the saving event has in some way taken place
outside of man•• sphere) or rather, it reconciles objectivity
and absolute demythologtzing, for however objecti~e the event
may be, still it no less absolutely excludes ''myth" in the
strict sense of the worc1.49
He

then protects Bultmann from those who lft>uld interpret Bultmann's

Christ-event only subjectively; such people, in interpreting Bultmann,
say that Christ's death is an indispensable inspiration for the
existentiell decision.
But Why is it necessary to refer to the cross? If, in order to
receive my salvation, I am obliged to refer to Christ as the
great example, must that -n ot be because <i>d Himself has expressed the type of my authentic existence in the death of Christ?
If Q>d saves m.e in attaching me in some way to the cross of
Jesus, is it not because He Himself bas spoken to me from the
cross? Then on Calvary there must have bee~an objective divine
manifestation of tbe elements of salvation.
Malevez tries valiantly to make Bultmann palatable both to·those who
think he cannot accept objective history and to those who think be
need not accept objective history.

But Malevez fails in bis attempt

to attribute objectivity (historicity) to the saving event of Christ
as Bultmann views this event.

He

says that to accomplish an objective

interpretation, he must "make Bultmann say"; that is precisely the
problem.

If one follows Bultmann's thought from beginning to end,

one can see that he is unwilling to speak of any objective historical
event, or of a God considered objectively in the Christ-event.
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Malevez has put words in Bultmann's mouth.

His suggestion that a

subjective interpretation of Bultmann's Christ-event is actually
grounded in an objective interpretation is a suggestion i1hich
Bultmann could never accept and still reaaia true to existential
analysis and his presuppositions.
'lbe problem is that Bultmann is unprepared to speak of any
history other than present realized history.

He has not totally

dissociated himself from the older liberalism.

It would be easier

for Bultmann to make the statement, "God is loving," than for him to
confess, "God acted once for all on Calvary when the blood of His
Son dro~ped to the · ground for man's sake."

Por while the first state-

ment is tautologous, an axiomatic deduction, the second~• a statement
grounded in historical fact.

Malevez suggests that Bultmann is will-

ing to make the second statement, while he is hesitant to make even
the first.
'Ibis is the point at which the modern linguistic analysts • y

be of some value for us in this discussion.

'Ibey are not interested

in discussing the truth or falsehood of a statement; rather, tbey are

concerned about the prior meaning of a statement.

'Ibey want to know

What difference it makes-what a statement means-before they will

progress into a discussion of its falsity or truth.
Bultmann is concerned to say what the Christ-event means for
nodern man.

His whole process of demythologizing he bas carried on

in the hope of uking the terypa more meaningful.
there ls difficulty.

But at this point

Instead of anchoring the ter7ea in history, h~

bas put it into the realized eschatology of the present.

11le Gospel
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he is trying to make meaningful within the historical lives of men

is a Gospel not of historical fact, not anchored in God's act within
time, but a Gospel which is tautologou-• transcendent statement
bearing close resemblance to the statement ''God is loving. 1151
We have said above that the logical analysts ue asking the
question, What does it mean?

lbey have the right to know what

difference a proposition or a word makes within man's existence.
'Dley have the privilege of asking theologians to demonstrate what tbe
wrd "God" means.
challenge.

lbeologians such as Bultmann have taken up this

But Bultmann and other theologians like him who fail to

give objectivity to the historical facts of the life, death, and
resurrection of Christ, are unable to demonstrate the meaning of

"God" in the Christian faith precisely because of their failure to
begin with an historical base.

A theology which is to have meaning

within the historical lives of men today cannot be a theology based
on a transcendental axiom of God's love.

It will prove meaningless,

regardless of extensive existential analysis am demythologizing.
Bultmann's failure to·admit of -h istorical objectivity in the life,
death, and resurrection of Christ is disastrous.

111e archetypes of

his language which symbolize the existentialia may sound modern,
but in the end_they are meaningless to historical man because .they
are unhistorical.
Bultmann fails to reco1nize the validity of essential theology
not only in his rejection of objectivity in history; he also disregards
essential theology in his dealings with natural revelation.

As we

bave seen above, Bultmann asserts that man knows nothing of God •~•rt
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from the kerygma.

Be follows this course to refrain from any theo-

logical reference apart from the kerygmatic confrontation.

But his

effort to remain aloof from such essential theology seems to be for
naught.

Por it appears that the whole of existential analysis is a

revelation of God apart from the tertea• Man's recognition of the
existentialia, unattainable though they are by man's power, is a knowledge of

God

apart from tbe keryP!•

Bultmann himself seems to speak

of natural revelation, in an Augustinian thought-pattern, when be
asserts that man has a relation to God even before revelation:
has a relation to God in his search for God, conscious or
unconscious. Man's life is moved by the search for Goel because
it is always moved, consciously or unconsciously, by the question about his own personal existence! The question of God and
the question of myself are identical. 2

He

Bultmann will not admit that this "search for God" is natural revelation because to do so \10uld place him under obli1ation to speak of
this God apart from the kerygma.
speak of such a search.

Ard yet, he is not unwilling to

If man searches for God, her:must be endowed

with some prior knowledge of the God for

who■

be searches; the question

of his own personal existence, if it is identical with the question
of God, demonstrates some prior knowledge of God.

Bultmann is under

obligation -to discuss in greater detail the essential theology inherent in this natural revelation which he has unwittingly admitted as

existent.

His failure to do so is not only unfair to his own system

of thought; it is also a rejection of the Christian Church's doctrine
of God's partial revelation of His essence prior to and apart from
the Gospel.
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A consideration of Bultmann's rejection of essential theology
involves also a brief consideration of his relation to the Scriptures.
Just as Paul's statement, "If Christ be not raised, your faith is
vain; ye are yet in your sins, 1153 is a statement of indisputable
history, and so of "e_ssential'' theology, so also Paul's statement
belongs to the Scripture.

Bultmann, as a knowledgeable exegete,

handles the Scripture with care.

But already in bis selection of

those sections of Sc-ripture to be examined we begin to suspect a ·
deviate at work.

He is a re-incarnated Marcion, concentrating

almost exclusively upon the writings of St. Paul, and selecting as
his Gospel the Word .o f John.

'lbe Old 'n!stament, historical and un-

kerygmatlc as be sees it, is of little value for the Christian exegete.
Whatever else may be said of Bultmann's handling of the Sc~ipture,
it is safe to say that his initial approach to it is more Lutheran

than Reformed in nature.

1b that degree his approach is actually more

evangelical than some others•.

Por Barth's criticism of Bultmann's

hermeneutics in Kermma and Myth begins with the presupposition of
the sovereignty of God as its prime consideration?'It seems apparent,
even in the way that Barth gets ruffled, that Bultmann's apnroach to
the Scripture bears a closer similarity to the Confessional Law-Goape4
(problem-solution) character of scriptures than does Barth's.
Bultmann's hermeneutics considers as primary in one's encounter with
Scripture the malady of man and the grace of God• al~hough both are
distorted; he does not first hand us the Scripture, and then proceed
to swing it about like the s-,rd of the Sovereign lting.

Under the

surface Bultmann still retains some of his Lutheran upbringing.s, But
his approach to Scripture is but half the story.
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One cannot agree with Bultmann when he attempts to replace the
concepts of the New Testament with scientific substitutes gleaned
from existential analysis.

Although Tillich is not complet~Jy correct

when he says that the myths of the New Testament should be broken and
recognized as myths• while at the same time "maintained in their
symbolic form aid not replaced by scientific substitutes,"56 he is
closer to a correct working method than is Bultmann, with his fashioned replacements.
Bultmann's collapsed eschatology also affects his approach to
the Scripture.

He feels that the kairos of the New Testament can

be best explained in terms of the present moment.

Such an eschato-

logical approac~ necessitates the use of the scientific substitutional
forms to which Tillich refers.

'l'hielicte takes Bultmamto task in

this regard, warning that it is impossible to translate the mythology
of the New Testament into the language of contemporary myth by substituting the abstract, monistic, immanent philosophy of existence
for a kerygma anchored in history.

He proceeds to an even more telling

arg1.111ent (admitting his reliance upon Roman Catholic theologians in
this matter), suggesting that perhaps with some degree of wisdom God
specifically chose the time and the mythology of the New Testament
fulness" in order to preserve, in the myth of the three-stQried

11

universe 1 the i.dea of transendence.

"That is what made it peculiarly

fitted to expresa the otherness of God and his intervention in salvation history. 11S7 Perhaps it was in view of the modern world of subjectivism, the world suffering from Cartesian blight, that God chose
the time of the New Testament to reveal Himself most dramatically as
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the Transcemient in the flesh, as God become

man in Christ.

Perhaps

the pictures are not to be replaced with scientific substitutes from
eschatological existential a-n alysis.
As a final comment on Bultmann's usage of the Scripture, we must
consider the role of the christocentric approach to Scripture.
Bultmann has said that no exegesis is presuppositionless.

Lutherans

have agreed, suggesting that all Scripture is to be considered in

the light of the Gospel-presupposition.
News

The Gospel itself is the Good

of the unique union of God and man in the God-man Jesus Christ,

come to redeem from the law.

A

cbristocentric approach to the Scrip-

ture is an approach which tates into serious consideration the union
of divine ard human in Jesus Christ.

It is not improper, then, to

argue that Jesus Christ provides the proper hermeneutic for study of

the Scriptures.

We certainly must

refresh ourselves at the deep wells of Reformation theology, with
its insistence that the bypostatic union of the divine and human
in Jesus Christ is the archettpus of theological speech, and that
the new humanity of the risen Lord provides us with a kind of
third dimension beyond our abort4.ve antinomies and dichotomies
of thought ••• Por this divine-human event not only circumscribes
theological 1aguage, but positively directs its line of analogical inference. 5
While we might not accept all of the doctrinal implications of this
Reformed statement (e.g.
valid.

11

new11 humanity), its major thrust is certainly

Por if theologians take seriously in their approach to Scripture

the God-man Jesus Christ, anchored in history, they will be preserved
from an exegesis with presuppositions grounded solely in man•s predicament and existence.

Bultmann's approach to Scripture lacks both a

serious consideration of Jesus as God-man, and an acknowledgement of
His historicity.

His approach is not christocenttic as such.
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Our

analysis and critique of Bultmann's selected theology has

led us from a consideration of existential analysis as an incomplete
theology to a consideration of his rejection of "essential" theology.
While we have neither the obligation nor the space to demonstrate
specifically how the critique of his theology affects the languageview issuing from it, we shall indicate some areas in which further
study of the effects could be made.

If his theology has given birth

to a specific view of language, a critique of that theology will
call for a revision of such a language-view.

And so, if existential

analysis bas demonstrated itself to be an incomplete basis upon which
to construct a full-blown theology; if it fails to do justice to an
evaluation of the wrath of God; if it partakes in the Cartesian blight
upon modern man; if it has not the tools with which to bardle the
metaphysical questions and problems of life; and if it prohibits
any consideration of God in and of Himself; then surely it is a
poorly constructed foundation upon which to build one's view of
language.

Por it fails to consider those aspects of language which

arise from within the existence of -man, but are ruled invalid by
prior axiom.

Bultmann's theology refuses to deal with God "i·n

essence"; it has a built-in protection against the affirmations of
history.
of

God

His language-view too refuses to deal with the "essence"

even though some sort of substantival self is talking, and

even though thi~ self is seeking for an essential God within existence.
The denial of historical objectivity denies such a view of language
the very iistorical force it needs to make the transcendent God
''meaningful" within the course of man's contemporary histoiy.

In
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addition, Bultmann's view of language has a definite parallel in his
hermeneutics.

Insofar as the Christian Cburcb can accuse him validly

of an approach to the Scripture made with utter disregard for the

historical union of God and man in the Lord Jesus Christ, with equal
validity the Christian Church can accuse his language-view of never
speaking about the Transcendent Q>d in any event (the kerypa notwithstarding), but speaking and referring only to and about man.
Such a charg~ is both serious and straightforward, but it is nevertheless accurate and specific.
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APPBNDIX A
Outline of Sermon of May 30, 1943

('Ibis sermon of Bultmann's was preached on the text of John 16:22-33.
I-t is taken from 'J.'bis World and Be)'!>nd, pp. 189-200. 'lbe existential,
-~~lie archetypes are underlined two times. The authentic referents
~~ QP the right, the unauthentic on the left.)
Comunication 'th God-Prayer (existence; ge~s2ibilit! of ~elation to being)
possible onl:t •,n t~at day," a,t the ,te:rai}•l eoiat of the age, wbea

all o

ressive

roblems are solved; pure

JoX

(self-understanding in the
c:ncrete; authentic beln1?
threatened by the 'ltOrld no threat of removal
temporal
lies beyond the world
changes to anxious care no ob Jee t of joy
all becomes clear for us
ha~ obj~ts of joy
self-explanatory
brou ton b freedom (decision for existence in
the moment)
bound by ourselves from
freedom from ourselves
such f reedoa
open to all encounters of life
love frees from inner burdens
self-will
no object
seek freedom from enfreed from unendurable situation
counter of life
past gone
freed from·f~ar and dismay
comes onl from bein alone in resence of God
Unauthentic archetype
dt;.~th;1 r:,,1aced bt enc~u~ter)
"anxiety"
onfroated by God alone
linging to something
\tOrld fades away
covered by rags
eady to bare to God
trying to hide
o understand ourselves
power of deat
relationships loosened
ossible onl throu h the cross
;~~:::::::::::::::~lsultlmate solitude o man before God
_
urrenders wishes to will of God
elf-surrender to God
roved in o enness to encounters of life (D10111ent)
continued at this point on next page
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roved in o enness to encounters of life (moment)
return to life (true sacrifice)
task in life threat- open and free
ened, ruined
ready to resign to sacrifice
wretched from loved
without fear
ones
leads to genuine encounter with God
entails ain
secret joy of the Christian spirit
shining cross of Christ
in solitariness before God
bri •one ression of faith
. quick, impulsive
solid aith grows in expression
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